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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1732

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BRIEFS

YUGOSLAV WOMEN'S GROUP IN POLAND--(PAP)--A delegation of the conference for socio-political activeness of the women of Yugoslavia with chairman Vera Kovacevic was in Poland at the invitation of the National Council of Polish Women (KPRK). The delegation held talks with the KRKP presidium, familiarized itself with the participation of women in the socialist development of Poland, and also with the activity of various elements of the Polish women's movement in the Warsaw and Lublin voivodships. In addition, the delegation paid a visit to the Minister of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs and to the Vice Minister [Undersecretary of State] of Justice where it was informed about Polish social policy and also the participation of Poland in the implementation of the UN program for women's rights. During a visit to the Children's Health Center, the delegation handed over a beautiful painting, a gift from the women of Yugoslavia. At the conclusion of the visit, Wit Drapich, vice chairman of the All-Polish Committee of the Front of National Unity (OK FJN), received the delegation. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13-14 Oct 79 p 4]

CSO: 2600

HOXHA, OTHERS SIGN KAPO OBITUARY

[Editorial Report] In the Tirana daily BASHKIMI of 25 September 1979, p 2 the following signed the official obituary of Politburo member Hysni Kapo: Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, Adil Carcani, Ramiz Alia, Kadri Hazbiu, Haki Toska, Hekuran Isai, Manush Myftiu, Pali Miska, Rita Marko, Spiro Koleka, Simon Stefani, Pilo Peristeri, Lenka Cuko, Llambi Gegprifti, Qirjako Mihali, Haxhi Lleshi, Muslim Peza, Shefqet Peci, Telo Mezini, Spiro Moisiu, Nexhmije Hoxha, Vito Kapo, Maliq Sadushi, Fiqret Shehu, Lumturi Rexha, Rrapo Dervishi, Muco Delo, Shaho Luci, Marie Temali, Abdyl Agalliu, Eleni Selenica, Dhimiter Brisku, Riza Veipi, Ibrahim Gjevori, Petro Dode, Tefta Cami, Delo Balili, Themie Thomai, Mehmet Rama, Luan Babameto, Rahman Hanku, Hajdar Aranitasi, Nesti Nase, Llambi Zicishti, Qamil Hamza, Kristaq Dollaku, Xhafer Spahiu, Nedin Hoxha, Viktor Nushi, Gjela Biba, Xhorxhi Robo.

CSO: 2100

COL GEN KHRISTO DOBREV INTERVIEWED ABOUT HIS PAST

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 19 Sep 79 pp 1-2

[Interview with Col Gen Khristo Dobrev, no place or date indicated, by Col Rangel Zlatkov: "Revolutionary Optimism--Duty, Faith, Responsibility; Untiring Labor and Love of People"]

> [Text] In connection with the 35th anniversary of the socialist revolution and the Bulgarian People's Army we are publishing, under the headline "Revolutionary Optimism--Duty, Faith, Responsibility," an interview with Col Gen Khristo Dobrev.

[Question] When and where were you born? What most vivid moment of your boyhood do you recall?

[Answer] I was born on 2 June in the historic year 1923. My birthplace was the small (Lovchansko) village of Dragana, nestled among the high cliffs in the picturesque valley of the Kamenitsa River which cuts through the northernmost slopes of the Balkan Range.

At the time Dragana was a poor village. Small fields, situated on steep slopes, and terraces on hills between large forest tracts, with their stony and clayey soil yielded a low income, which hardly sufficed to feed the population and pay taxes. The people of Dragana eked out a living by hard work day and night. My parents were no exception. At the age of five I began to herd cattle and by 12 I was a regular agricultural worker. My entire childhood and youth like that of all country children were spent in backbreaking toil. The most cherished moments in my life were the days I spent on my school bench, a few holidays and evenings when the progressive youth in the village arranged entertainment and evening parties, educational meetings and secret assemblies of illegal RMS [Workers' Youth Union] groups.

Under the influence of my older cousins Stoyko Danchev and Kolyu Chikov (they died later on as partisans), who as RMS members were repeatedly arrested and expelled from high school, I began to read progressive literature and sympathize with the revolutionary movement as early as junior high school. I

was powerfully affected by the following books: "Scientific and Religious World Outlook" by P. Yudin, "Philosophy and Life" by B. Mitin, "From Heraclites to Darwin" by Lunkevich, "Mother" by Gor'kiy, "The Breakthrough" by Kr. Belev, "The Iron Heel" and "Martin Eden" by Jack London; by the poetry of Botev, Smirnenski etc. I was admitted into the ranks of the RMS at the age of 14.



A vivid recollection of this period that remains with me is my first participation in an illegal rayon RMS meeting in August 1937, devoted to the anti-war struggle. The meeting was conducted in the locality of "Merata" between the villages of Dragana, Ugurchin and Orlene, with RMS representatives participating--mainly students and schoolchildren from several villages. The RMS organization in Dragana was represented by Kolyu Chikov, who at that time was a student, and by me, who had just graduated from first-level secondary school.

It was a clear moonlit night. We moved along a path that wound through forests, meadows and hollows. When we came near the meeting place, several times unknown persons came out of the brush in front of us and pronounced the password. We were permitted to pass after giving the response. By 2300 hours everybody had arrived and the meeting began. A speech on the anti-war struggle was given by the representative of the okoliya RMS committee. He spoke with a great deal of inspiration and persuasion. After this a discussion took place. The meeting broke up somewhere around two o'clock in the morning. A cordial leave-taking followed.

This meeting with all its revolutionary romantic character--moonlit night, passwords, responses, the great learning of the comrades that spoke, the unanimity, enthusiasm and great mutual respect of all the participants left a profound trace in my consciousness.

[Question] Where did you study and when did you complete your education? What most forceful personalities (teachers) left lasting impressions on you and for what?

[Answer] In September 1937 I enrolled in the fourth year in the Ugurchin incomplete second-level secondary school. I was extremely fortunate to be able to continue my education. Every Saturday I walked to Dragana, which is 14 km from Ugurchin, and my mother loaded me down with four or five loaves of bread, a pot of cooked beans or yoghurt, prunes and other dry food, which I lived on till the next Saturday. In Ugurchin I associated with progressive young people.

One morning in March 1938 the village awoke to find itself strewn with leaflets of a revolutionary content. This was the occasion for making a search of the apartments of many progressive students and schoolchildren. Even though the authorities didn't manage to find anything compromising, I and a few other students were expelled "on circumstantial evidence" with the right to transfer to another second-level secondary school.

I enrolled in the Troyan second-level secondary school where I completed the fourth and fifth year. In the autumn of 1939 I transferred to the Lovech second-level secondary school. In both second-level secondary schools there were RMS organizations which brought together the most spirited young people and generated vigorous revolutionary activity. In the fifth year I was an RMS division monitor, in the sixth year monitor of a class consisting of six divisions, and in the seventh and eighth year I joined the second-level secondary school RMS governing body.

From second-level secondary school I have preserved the memory of a number of teachers who, despite the ferocious persecution on the part of the fascist authorities, gave us valuable assistance in the work in legal mass organizations and, as far as was possible, protected us in the teachers' council against the attacks of fascist reactionaries. I shall always remember with kindest sentiments such teachers as Mr and Mrs Nikolov, literature instructors at the Troyan secondary school, and instructors Georgiev, Pencheva, Raycheva, Kuneva, Terzieva, Kalchev etc. of the Lovech secondary school. They were all people of broad culture, pedagogical skill and civic courage, honest and honored, imbued with great love of mankind.

But my best teachers in the revolutionary struggle were tried-and-true revolutionaries Ivan Ivanski, Khristo Kurpachev, Docho Shipkov, Stoyan Mirev, Petur Neshev etc. They left indelible impressions in my consciousness, above all for their profound ideological conviction and adamancy, for their limitless devotion to the party, for their steadfastness and daring in the face of the enemy.

After 9 September 1944 I had the good fortune to graduate from two military academies in Moscow where I met fine instructors, alumni of the great party of Lenin. If I had to characterize them briefly, I would mention that, apart from their communist conviction and selfless devotion to the CPSU, they were notable for their great learning as military specialists and for their high sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of assigned missions.

[Question] When did you begin to engage in communist activity for the first time? Would you indicate the first communists (RMS members) that you became acquainted with, and what was your contact with them?

[Answer] As I have already said, I began to engage in communist activity on my admission to the RMS in the summer of 1937. I worked first of all with RMS members Stoyko Danchev, Kolyu Chikov, Mono Chikov, Marin Mikhaylov, Pecho Lalev, Marin Myashkov, Stoyko Neshev, Dino Sarafidov etc., to whom I was bound by great friendship in addition to a firm ideological and organizational tie.

[Question] What personal defeat did you suffer in the revolutionary struggle before the triumph of the socialist revolution? How did it affect your further activity?

[Answer] Perhaps the word "defeat," and even more so "personal defeat" are not the most suitable in the present case. We military men are accustomed to linking this word with the combat operations of military formations. Therefore I will speak about my personal failures in the revolutionary struggle. Beyond a doubt there have been such failures and, I must say, repeated ones. The path of a revolutionary is difficult and thorny. Nor does everything go smoothly in his activity. The reasons for failures and defeats varies, but most often they were due to our inadequate experience and foresight and to the fact that we had pitted against us a powerful and treacherous adversary with great military superiority and many years of experience in the struggle aginst the progressive forces of the people.

Let me point out a few of my most significant personal failures in my revolutionary activity.

At the beginning of February 1942 the fascists succeeded in seizing on me a bag of illegal materials at the moment RMS member Ivan Dochev delivered it to me in the Lovech secondary-school building. Complying with the party's instructions not to give in to the enemy, Ivan Dochev and I at once went underground. Therewith began a new page in my life, my participation in the partisan movement.

On 6 May 1943 in a forest near the village of Orlene six of us partisans were surrounded by fascist police. A battle began in which Comrades Kolyu Patarinski and Tsanko Vulchev perished. This was a serious failure.

A week later partisan Tsan'o Patarinski and I were discovered by chance in a water-mill near the village of Borima and surrounded by the police. In the unequal battle Patarinski was wounded. Although we managed to come out of the fire alive, this was a failure for us.

At the beginning of January 1944, as political commissar of the Khristo Kurpachev detachment I was in the second band which was pinned down by snow; we were camping in a cave west of the village of Lisets. On 7 January the enemy discovered us. A battle began with the police detachment, reinforced subsequently by numerous troops, that lasted for an entire day and night. Eleven daring partisans perished. Days of severe testing for the detachment followed. For nearly two months the fascist bloodhounds pursued us, organizing blockades, ambushes and searches of the forests and villages. Scores of partisans and supporters were shot. This was a great failure both for the detachment and for me personally.

On 16 June 1944 we made an attack on the village of Beglezh. In the battle with the police that broke out, four partisans perished, including the legendary chief of staff of the 21st operational zone Stoyan Birev. Another great failure.

As for the second part of your question, I must say that every failure enriched me with valuable revolutionary experience and steeled me as a fighter. And this is understandable because at that time we were studying the art of the revolutionary struggle, not in school and in the academy, but in the fire of class battles and at the price of great risks, trials and costly casualties.

[Question] Finishing up your life and work before 9 September 1944, will you highlight in summary the main moments of your life history that have helped shape you as a communist activist?

[Answer] The greatest role in molding me as a communist was played by my association with activists in the communist movement and especially my admission into the ranks of the militant RMS in the summer of 1937, my admission into the party on 30 November 1942, and my participation in the partisan movement from February 1942 to 9 September 1944.

[Question] Why did you choose the profession of regular army man?

[Answer] I must say that I did not choose my profession of regular army man. This choice was made by the party, which immediately after the victory of the 9 September uprising posted me to serve in the army. And although I had never thought of becoming a military man, I accepted this fact as something entirely natural because at that time the main tasks facing Fatherland-Front Bulgaria were immediate entry in the war against the Hitler-fascist conquerors and strengthening of the people's regime. I believed that my communist duty was to take a most active part in the accomplishment of these tasks. Later on, when they had been accomplished,

another first-priority task arose as a result of the cold-war policy adopted by the Western imperialist states--that of strengthening the defense capability of our homeland and of the socialist community as a whole. This dictated my remaining for good in the ranks of the Bulgarian People's Army, which for me has been and continues to be a high honor and trust and at the same time a tremendous responsibility to the party and the people.

[Question[What are the most characteristic moments of your service in the People's Army? Describe them, citing specifically some striking examples.

[Answer] There have been many interesting and characteristic moments during my army service. I shall never forget the first few years after the war when the command personnel of the army had still not been purged of fascist elements and a bitter class struggle seethed in it. The fascist officers, enjoying the protection of the then war minister, Damyan Velchev, sabotaged measures of the people's regime, had a hostile attitude towards us newly commissioned people's army officers and strove in every way to hamper and discredit us. The fiercest reactionaries hatched conspiratorial counter-revolutionary plans. Things went so far Damyan Velchev issued a provocative order that grace was to be said in the army. Conspiratorial organizations such as "Military Union," "Tsar Krum," "Neutral Officer" etc. were discovered in some headquarters.

In this complex situation, relying on the masses of the soldiers and keeping constantly on the alert, we political officers worked hard and persistently to neutralize the fascist elements among the officers, to discover and render harmless the conspiratorial groups, and kindle and maintain the revolutionary enthusiasm of the soldiers. I recall how many sleepless nights we spent in barracks and headquarters with submachineguns in hand. Many malicious plots of the enemies were exposed, many secret clues of fascist conspiracies were unraveled, many enemy provocations were averted.

At the end of 1947 I left to study at the Frunze Academy in Moscow. My three-year stay in the Soviet land, my contacts with the Soviet people who are dear to my heart, and my hard work to master Soviet military science played an important role in shaping me as a military specialist.

An important moment in my military life was my entry upon duty in the General Staff at the end of 1950. Here for the first time I encountered the complex and important functions that the General Staff performed for the defense of the country. The requirements set for the job of staff officer were very high. Due to my lack of experience in staff duty I faced incredible difficulties. And only thanks to the assistance of Soviet specialists General Bobkov, Colonel Abramov and Colonel Semekov, who were serving at the time on the General Staff in the capacity of advisers, and by laboring day and night did I succeed in overcoming these difficulties and gaining some experience and skill as a staff officer.

In 1954 I enrolled in the General Staff Academy of the Soviet Army. On graduating from it I was appointed to an appropriate position. New missions, new responsibilities, new successes and failures. The staff experience gained in this position proved very useful in my further work.

An especially important period in my military life was my service as general commanding antiaircraft defense and the air force. Here I encountered complex problems in directing a branch of the service that I was not sufficiently familiar with and that had many distinctive features. In a very short time I had to study in detail not only the situation and status, but also the distinctive features of the structure, armament, training and combat employment of the forces and resources for antiaircraft defense and the air force. During my service in this position I gained valuable command experience.

[Question] What will you say about the friendship of men in arms? How true is the maxim that this friendship lasts a lifetime? Is it of transitory significance or is it, in your opinion, absolute?

[Answer] The friendship of soldiers is especially strong and lasting. This is due to the fact that it comes into being under the stern conditions of army life. It is based on the sacred duty of defending the homeland. It is a prerequisite for the accurate and coordinated working of the complex military organism, and on the success of such working in time of war the fate of individual soldiers and military teams and formations depends. My friendship with Col Gen Palin, Col Gen Kosev, Col Gen Papazov and many other generals and officers as well has successfully stood the test of more than 30 years.

[Question] What human virtues do you prize most? What shortcomings do you hate most intensely?

[Answer] My experience in the revolutionary struggle and in my army service has taught me to prize most in servicemen their political consciousness and devotion to the party and people, and in second place their industriousness and professional skill.

I take into account and consider it especially important and necessary that every soldier possess morale characteristics such as daring and resolution, initiative and diligence.

Of the moral qualities I rank first honesty, comradeship and an attentive attitude towards people.

I hate meanness and bootlicking, fear and faint-heartedness. I consider especially harmful and dangerous for command personnel of all ranks such qualities as political instability, intriguing, bragging and playing the good guy . A commander who exhibits signs of political vacillation,

who sows intrigues, who blows his own horn or, for the purpose of gaining cheap prestige, exhibits signs of liberalism and lack of principle, does irreparable harm to the training of his subordinates and to the unity and combat capability of military teams, thus cutting off the branch he is holding on to. No less harmful are manifestations of arrogance, subjectivism and pessimism on the part of commanders and chiefs, which are expressed in a scornful attitude towards the labor of his subordinates, in the assignment of tasks beyond their strength, and in giving unfair ratings. All this kills enthusiasm and chills the initiative and activism of servicemen.

[Question] What personalities in Bulgaria and in the world are your idols and what virtues of theirs attract you?

[Answer] I venerate the inspired insight of the founders of Marxist-Leninist science and the communist movement--Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as the deathless feat and self-sacrifice of the fighters for our people's liberation--Botev and Levski. I revere the radiant image of thousands of communist revolutionaries who devoted their lives to the struggle for the victory of our working class and for the triumph of communism, and whose best qualities Georgi Dimitrov embodied.


I especially honor and esteem the heroes of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, who performed an unparalleled feat and defended the cause of socialism, freedom and the independence of dozens of countries and peoples.

My idols, if I can put it thus, are the famous generals of the Soviet school, and especially Frunze and Rokossovskiy, for whom I have the profoundest respect because they combine within themselves the brilliant skill of generalship, personal bravery and exceptional attention to their men.

[Question] What do you wish for the men and commanders of the People's Army?

[Answer] I wish that all the servicemen of the Bulgarian People's Army should constantly raise the combat readiness of staffs and units, improve their skill in the conduct of combat operations under the complex conditions of modern war and, more especially, that command personnel should master the difficult art of controlling and thoroughly backing up troop operations, and make their own the Soviet Army's rich combat experience and the Soviet military art.

[Question] What is your personal motto in life? (Write it in your own handwriting.



[Answer] My motto is "Faithful and devoted service to party and people."

Khr. Dobrev

6474
CSO: 2200

EDITORIAL URGES BETTER TRAINING OF AIR FORCE PILOTS

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 19 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Concern Over Flight Safety"]

[Text] The combat characteristics of airplanes and helicopters with their electronic equipment and various kinds of armament make possible successful accomplishment of the most complex missions in modern combat. There has, as a result, been a rise in the requirements set for pilot combat training, for teamwork of control posts and for observance of established procedure in air operations.

When he presented the banner to one of the front-ranking units in the socialist competition, Army General Dobri Dzhurov, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and minister of national defense, stressed in his remarks that only an officer who is not satisfied with what he has achieved and who constantly upgrades the level of his military and political knowledge can reach the peak of combat expertise and become a highly competent leader and teacher.

It is the duty of every officer in our air force to be equal to these requirements. But the pilot's profession falls among those kinds of human activity that we of necessity consider to be inseparably associated with scrupulous observance of safety measures.

Just as before, the pilot's sphere of activity is the air. But the new technology makes new demands on the crew. Thorough mastery of aerodynamics takes on a special role, for not only the flight of the winged vehicle, but also the success of the combat mission and the safety of the airman himself depend on the skillful application of its laws.

Accident-free operation depends, to a great extent, on the proper training of young fliers. Joining the winged combat arm is a very complex process. For not only must they master the skills of aviation technology, aerodynamics and the art of piloting; they must also nurture in themselves high morale, the readiness to take a justified risk, to hold out under the most difficult conditions of modern combat and win the victory.

In the execution of combat training missions special circumstances sometimes arise in flight that put the crew in a difficult situation. To be sure, sudden complications in flight can be encountered not only by someone with many years of flying experience behind him, but also by someone recently graduated from the air force school. But whereas the former has much experience and high expertise, the young flier has little of either. And as is known, heaven spares nobody. Therefore the young flier must be taught professional skills and have nurtured in him the qualities that will enable him to come out the victor in any unexpected situation.

The pilot's law is the flight manual. Its every procedure is permeated with profound commonsense, recorded on the basis of the vast experience gained by many generations of aviators. This manual and the airplane and helicopter piloting instructions give the answers to the questions regarding what the crew should do in a given situation. But the above-mentioned documents require the flier to act on his own iniative in keeping with the situation that has arisen. What initiative can we speak of in the case of crew commander Senior Lt V. Dimitrov, who on a flight on a prescribed itinerary with passengers on board got into clouds without being sufficiently trained for such a test; everything came out all right only by mere happenstance. That is why it is very important so to set up the combat training process that the fliers' expertise grows constantly, with flight safety always assured at the same time. But we still encounter cases where there is unwarranted delay in putting young pilots into service or where the conditions for the execution of flight exercises are made very easy.

Flight discipline is precise observance of the procedure and regulations set down in the documents governing flight operations. All elements of flight, from starting the engine and taxiing for a take-off to parking on the conclusion of a mission, are equally important. Improper execution of even just one of them jeopardizes the safety of the entire flight.

The undisciplined pilot in combat is the enemy's best target. The experience of past wars teaches us this. The famous Soviet aces were victorious in air battles because of their constant inner concentration and thoroughness and because they showed judicious initiative based on sober calculation and profound knowledge of their aircraft's capabilities and the enemy's tactics.

The assurance of flight safety is a comprehensive and multifaceted task. It depends not just on the fliers' morale and professional training, but also on flight organization. Commanders, political bodies and party organizations should constantly concentrate their attention on questions regarding the improvement of control.

The party's goals inspire all working people to fulfill and overfulfill the creative plans, thus enhancing the people's welfare and strengthening our socialist homeland's defense capability and international position. Fliers,

engineers and the aviation specialists of military airfields, as well as all service personnel are preparing to greet Bulgarian People's Army Day worthily, are persistently upgrading their combat skill, increasing the combat readiness of units and constantly striving to ensure safe flights.

6474
CSO: 2200

NEW MILITARY CONSTRUCTION REGULATIONS EXPLAINED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 5, 1979 signed to press 12 Jul 79 pp 258-259

[Article by Lt Col G. Simmross and Capt F. Bernhardt: "New Military Regulations in the Military Construction Engineering Field"]

[Text] On 1 March 1979 the new DV [service regulation] 072/0/001--Military Construction Engineering and Military Construction Engineering Equipment--took effect. It replaces the former DV 068/0/001 regulation. Revision of the old DV was necessary to better reflect the requirements of daily practice in military structural engineering in a military technological, military-economic and organizational sphere. The new DV is oriented toward:

--further intensification of military construction activity in troop units and groups

--more effective employment of all financial and material means

--improving operational readiness and utilization of military construction engineering and

--qualification of training and advanced training.

It is an important working principle for commanders and technicians in construction engineering and combat engineering troop units, but also for commanders and technicians in other branches of the military, special-employment units and services of the National People's Army [NVA] and the border units of the GDR, who construct buildings for training and to improve quarters and service facilities.

The new regulations relate better than before to the conditions of utilization of military construction engineering at the construction site. From this, the new obligations and tasks of commanders and directors, technical officers, cadets, NCOs, drivers and machinists are derived, revised in accordance with their responsibilities and clearly defined. Thus it will now be possible to perform military construction engineering on a constant and responsible basis.

With regard to training and advanced training, especially of drivers and machinists, trained instructors will be used in the future. This will surely increase the quality of training and have a positive reaction on operational readiness of technical equipment. Even the deputy experts for military construction engineering were delegated accurately defined areas of responsibility; they are employed in different ways and usually manage only one to two groups of machines.

New regulations were also established with regard to planning, cost accounting and evaluation. The documents are written so that the required information is obtained with a minimum of expense. This simplifies not only staff management of all processes of military construction engineering, but also makes time available for educational work by the commanders and members of the military construction engineering service. Emphasis in this regard is placed on:

--the inclusion of all military construction engineering into the annual technical check

--training of operating crews for military construction engineering and their advanced qualification

--qualifications of nonstructural machinists for mechanization equipment (small technology)

--proper transfer/acceptance of military construction engineering to drivers and machinists by company commander or authorized platoon leader, and

--training and use of shift-drivers.

With regard to systematically preventive maintenance there will be in the future an "Inspection with Repair" and "Repair after Inspection". These types of repair belong to the main types of planned repairs implemented in the central repair shops of the NVA or in domestic industrial facilities. The commanders have a decisive influence in this regard. They are responsible for a realistic planning appropriate to utilization schedules and for proper delivery with regard to schedule, model number and condition of the particular military equipment.

With the publication of DV 072/0/001 it became necessary to revise the catalog for utilization and repair of military construction engineering and to bring it into agreement with the new regulation. For instance, catalog K 072/3/001 --Military Construction Engineering--was completely revised for the beginning of the 1979/80 training year. All production machines and equipment and mechanization equipment of military construction engineering are included in it. Each information sheet contains quantity data and technical, technological and economic data for the use of the particular technology. The catalog is an aid for planning and construction preparation and closes an existing gap for the users of military construction equipment.

Another catalog with the designation K 072/3/002--Repair Standards for Military Construction Equipment--contains utilization schedules, maintenance and repair techniques and time standards for repairs. The most recent status of technical equipment of the construction troop units and technological experiences are included in it. This catalog is needed in planning and in preparations and cost accounting of repair measures. Strict adherence to the repair standards will further increase the quality and effectiveness of repair procedures.

In close cooperation with this is the new catalog K 072/3/003--spare parts, tools and accessories for military technology. In contains parts numbers, use standards and industrial sale prices for military equipment subject to central supply. When revising this catalog the assortment was expanded and new use standards prepared.

Catalog K 072/3/003 has many uses. It is an important reference work for uniform annual consumption planning for military construction equipment, for monthly requirements from the central depot and for management and order in the technical depot itself. The task of troop units is to work out individual depot stock standards with reference to the material consumption standards contained in the catalog. Directions for this are found in the supplement "Level of Spare Parts Supply in the Interest of Effective Troop Repairs" in MILITAERTECHNIK, No 4/78 p 189.

Regardless of the new DV and the new catalogs, the publication of instructions is being continued this year. Directives taking effect in 1979 were:

--A 072/1/108--Cement transport equipment

--A 072/1/109--Construction Lifts/cranes

--A 072/1/110--Processing machines and

--A 072.1.111--Transport mixers

For 1980 other directives will be issued to complete this series.

These directions for use of military construction equipment have become a permanent component in the training of construction troops and have proven valuable. The excessive number of operating and maintenance faults which show up in premature failures during use does prove that these instructions for further training and preparation for use or maintenance by machinists/drivers are used too little. This problem must be counteracted in the future by all commanders and officers, cadets and NCOs active in the military construction engineering sphere.

In connection with the issuance of new or revised military regualtions, the new edition of the Handbook for Engineering Troops is important. Since truck-, military construction and engineering technology is very important to the productivity of construction troops, Part II of the Handbook was issued.

It contains all important construction elements and components of production technlogy, their design and employment principles. In addition, it contains all important principles for use and repair of military construction equipment. Thus after 1980 there will be a military construction engineering handbook available to instructions, machinists, drivers and specialists which meets the greater demands of technical training.

9280
CSO: 2300

UNITY OF PEOPLE, ARMY SEEN UNDER SOCIALISM

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 37, Sep 79 signed to press 10 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Col Manfred Seifert: "The Advantages of the Socialist Army: In Socialism the Exercise of Military Power and the Workers' Vital Interests Are Fused to a Degree Hitherto Unknown." For an interview on this subject with Lt Gen Werner Rothe, deputy ground forces commander and chief, Political Administration, National People's Army (NVA), see JPRS 73253, 18 Apr 79, No 1670 of this series, pp 64-68]

[Text] A work of art is being discussed. The Soviet-American coproduced documentary film series "The Decisive Front." Members of the National People's Army are impressed and moved by this epic. This film imparts many insights and lessons. Two of these are always at the center of the discussion. One is the limitless heroism of the Soviet people in the struggle to defend their socialist homeland, the readiness of the most different types to sacrifice and the certainty of victory even on the darkest days. Inseparable from this is the ability of the party and state leadership of the USSR to mobilize the entire nation for the destruction of the enemy and to completely reorient the country to the needs of war under the most complicated conditions. These facts reflect the unlimited capabilities contained in the socialist state and social order.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism have repeatedly emphasized the inseparable bond between the military organization of a country and its political, social, economic and cultural structure. History itself, in the fire of bitter class battles such as in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union or in the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against American aggression, proves the irrefutable truth: socialism as a social order historically superior to imperialism can also build a better military organization.

Military Questions Solved on a Socialist Basis

It is one of the great achievements of our party that it logically and creatively applies the principles of the military organization of the victorious proletariat to our conditions and solves military questions on a new, a socialist basis.

The monopoly of the exploiter class on military power was also broken on German soil by this means. Under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party, there arose an army of which Comrade Erich Honecker said during his latest visit to the troops: "It is the first army of a German state whose mission is not to suppress its own and foreign peoples but rather to protect what the workers have created with their own hands... Class interests are identical from privates to the general. In this area are the invaluable advantages of a socialist army, the principles of its political and moral strength and determination."

The firm foundation of our national defense is the political power of the workers under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary party. The mission of socialist armed forces derives from their desire. The exercise of military power and the vital interests of the workers fuse to an hitherto unknown degree. At its party meetings and conferences, in its decisions and its activity as a whole, the party has always regarded the perfecting of national defense and thus also of the National People's Army as an inseparable component of the development of the GDR and of its firm anchorage in the socialist community of states. It has, in consideration of the international force relationship and the class combat situation, done that necessary and possible at the time for reliable military protection of peace and socialism. In this case it was always able to rely on such advantages and motive forces of socialist society as the growing political-moral and ideological unity of the people resulting from the increasing maturity of socialist conditions, a stable economic growth rate from decade to decade and the increasing political awareness of the citizens.

The level of education of youth under socialism grows hand in hand with political understanding for military tasks. Today over 93 percent of our youth have completed 10 years of school. Every fourth one has a college or trade school education. This youth documents its love of its socialist fatherland with high results in production, in tens of thousands of youth brigades and youth projects, by its social activity, not least by premilitary training in the GST [Society for Sport and Technology].

New Potentials Liberated for National Defense

With the resolutions of the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses, the party liberated new potentials of our social order for the perfection of national defense. The leading role of the working class and thus its influence on the defensive power of the socialist fatherland grows. Bound by a multitude of ties, members of production collectives increasingly influence directly the political-moral development of units. The best character features of the working class such as conviction, firmness, high proletarian discipline and organizing ability as well as the experience of their struggle are examples for the members of the National People's Army.

The indestructible arms alliance with the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact has reached a higher stage. In particular, the energetic aid of the Soviet Army continues to have a direct effect on increasing the combat power and combat readiness of the National People's Army. It is the aid of the army which gathered its rich experiences in heroic struggle on the "decisive front" and whose military doctrine and military science proved superior in this gigantic struggle for the life and death of the socialist order. Since the end of the 1960's the number of NVA generals and officers trained at Soviet military academies has doubled.

The program of the Ninth Party Congress is and remains of decisive significance and its realization allows the value of defending our workers' and peasants' state to become even more perceptible. The fruits of the unity of economic and social policy, our logical and successful policy of peace and detente, a clear and secure perspective for all citizens. All this leads to increasingly strong harmony of social and personal interests. It gives rise to word and deed for the reliable military protection of socialism and peace.

8373
CSO: 2300

SQUAD-LEVEL TACTICAL TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 37, Sep 79 signed to press 10 Sep 79 p 11

[Article by Maj Bodo Reichel: "The Efforts of the Most Demanding — Communists Set the Example: High Performances in Combat Training Are Achieved Without Tricks and Without Routine"]

[Text] Motors begin to howl. The armored personnel carriers [APC] move rapidly out of the cut in the woods to their places in the platoon column. Senior Lieutenant Horst Kallies carefully observes the reaction of the APC commanders and drivers to his commands. Today the plan calls for the complex of a motorized rifle platoon in the defense. The rating as a reflection of combat power counts when platoons are checked from head to toe in the GDR Salute 30 competition. But no training program requires what the senior lieutenant now lets be drilled. No one would have resented it if he had permitted occupying the prepared trench position without attack actions. That would have been simpler and also easier for many in the company. But to him it is a question of interesting and effective combat training. He doesn't think much of stereotypes.

The next commands seize his attention. "Dismount!" In seconds the soldiers squeeze through the hatches, jump from the moving APC. "Squad in line of skirmishers — Forward!" command the noncommissioned officers loudly. The squads deploy quickly into combat formation. The company commander's APC creeps slowly behind the motorized riflemen of the third squad which is at the point. He, like his comrades, is anxious about the test. The senior lieutenant assumed command of the company just short of three weeks ago. In an acting capacity to begin with but with prospects of continuing to command the combat collective. Senior Lieutenant Bodo Hoeft, under whose leadership the company won the best title three times and always took a leading position in the Arthur Ladwing unit, was transferred to battalion headquarters. Not very simple for Horst Kallies to take over such an "inheritance." But he is optimistic, the more so since he has the eight comrades of the party group behind him. Yesterday evening they sat down and assigned definite tasks to each communist. And all promised to do their best.

One Made a Stir

The third squad has now occupied the prepared trench position. Now all eyes are on three young communists. Officer Candidate Olaf Kretzmann is acting as platoon leader. The 21-year-old party member is finishing his six weeks of troop probation today. He has resolved that his platoon will master the tactical training with a "good." He forgoes assembling the squad leaders [and] gives the company commander's combat order to each on the spot. He precisely briefs each individual squad leader on the orientation points and firing sectors.

Corporal Andreas Krambach also participates in the briefing. The 20-year-old has been assigned as the political deputy. Although he is only in an acting capacity, he takes his task very seriously. The party group comrades had good reasons for entrusting the young SED candidate with this task. And the reason was not simply that Andreas Krambach, who normally functions as a deputy platoon leader, was considered to be a pleasant contemporary. He is very conscientious. Thus he knows precisely that he is not liked by many of the soldiers in their third half-year of service. When he reported in from the noncommissioned officer school in May 1978, the brandnew corporal created quite a stir during his first tour as duty noncommissioned officer. He made a very careful comparison of the names on police and sick call with the first sergeant's plans. He uncovered certain privileges of the comrades from the "thirds" and reported them. He acted conscientously against them, made his point, refused to be intimidated. Nothing has changed to date in his attitude.

Temptation Was Near

In the third squad Private First Class Reiner Hedderich looks over the firing sector assigned to him by the squad leader. Stalks of grass a half-meter high block his view. He pulls himself out of the trench, crawls, pressed against the ground, to where the grass is thickest. He clears the firing sector with his shovel. During this he continues to watch in the "enemy" direction, does not let himself be distracted. Nor does the fast approaching storm seems to bother him much. As it begins to rain, "Heddi," as the soldiers call him, continues to work industriously. He knows that many in the squad are watching him, the party member. Just like during combat training when they had to practice digging out rifle pits. Then he knew that he was being watched by Private Ramsch who lay next to him.

It was oppressively hot, sweat was pouring down his face. Reiner Hedderich could have taken the easy way out. There was an old rifle pit in front of him. Only 2 meters away. Just a few throws of the shovel — then he wouldn't have needed to sweat so much. And his intent to be the first to finish would have been realized for sure. But he came in second since Private Ramsch, the machinegunner, was ahead of him. He was cleverer, immediately grabbed an old pit that just had to be cleaned up a bit. The private first class is honest enough to admit that he toyed with the idea

of taking the easy way out. But digging out the rifle pit was part of the training. It was supposed to be practiced. Without tricks. For the private first class this was a challenge to himself and his comrades to honestly pass the examination. Just like now. Despite the rain running off his steel helmet down his neck, soaking his uniform. Even though the idea of moving back to the squad dugout was very tempting. But perhaps he also remembers the party statute that requires being a model. Do not the comrades need, even expect, his model, his example at this moment? He who is deputy squad leader and intends to pin on the best badge. A comrade who talks big in the barracks and then folds up out there. A "Heddi" who ducks should not and will not exist. Swing his shovel strongly, he continues to mow until he has a free field of view.

Each Sharpens His Edges

"Surprise fire! Take cover!" comes the command from the platoon leader. Communist Hedderich, who is standing next to the officer candidate, repeats it. In the same moment he pulls his protective mask from the bag, rapidly pulls it over his head. Corporal Kleineberg's squad moves into the squad bunker. Having been assigned to man the weapon, the private first class remains behind, continues to closely observe the battlefield, his assault rifle ready to fire.

The company commander and the platoon leader strive for a dynamic situation, for realism. Thus signal follows signal, command after command. Vision is decreased by smoke pots. Firecrackers burst loudly. Training hand grenades increase the noise of combat. Enemy forces, simulated by groups of targets at varying ranges, appear.

"Squad leader! OP-103... heavy machinegun!" reports Private First Class Hedderich to his squad leader.

Corporal Kleineberg reacts immediately. Muzzle blasts spray from the barrels of the light machinegun and assault rifle.

Reiner Hedderich is in his element. He can't be beaten out here on the battlefield. Here he can show what he has. A unit of word and deed. A comrade without faults?

By no means. Like everyone he has his good points and works to improve them. One is called discipline. As senior man in the barracks room he has to enforce it. But he can't always do it. Privates Gellert and Ramsch sometimes resist, don't take it seriously. Thus also the heavy and light machinegun loops in the third half-year of service. Party members Kretzmann and Krambach help Private First Class Hedderich. They support him, back him up but without taking away his responsibilities as senior man in the barracks room. Even more: they make clear demands of him. Like when the party group did when the private first class was still having trouble with self-discipline. Comrade Hedderich accepted these words. And with success in the judgement of the party group and superiors.

A Step Closer to the Goal

Training is over. The platoon has fallen in for evaluation. Higher headquarters has evaluated the platoon's tactical actions as "good." There are words of praise. The reaction to tactical problems was correct, expedient and within the prescribed time limits. The platoon received a one for three standard tests and a two for a fourth. There were also critical words. Not every command was given correctly. Moving into the counterfire position did not go smoothly. The comrades still need training.

Party members Kretzmann, Krambach and Hedderich made a significant contribution to the platoon's passing the test with the grade of "good." All three kept their promises made on the eve at the party group conference. The other two platoons also received a "good" this day. The company has thus come a significant step forward toward the intended fourth best title in the struggle for higher combat power and combat readiness. A good start for Senior Lieutenant Kallies, the company commander. An honorable result for the efforts of the most demanding.

8373
CSO: 2300

DEPUTY CIVIL DEFENSE COMMANDER OUTLINES PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS

East Berlin NATIONAL-ZEITUNG in German 19 Sep 79 p 5

[Interview with Maj Gen Dr Rolf Fischer, deputy director, GDR Civil Defense by Wolfgang Gebhardt: "Demanding Goals for the Protection of Life"]

[Text] Increased Readiness of Members and Volunteers of CD

NZ: What accomplishments are the members and volunteers of the GDR Civil Defense planning for the 30th anniversary of the founding of our republic?

Maj Gen Dr Fischer: Just like the workers in all sectors of our social life members and volunteers of the Civil Defense are showing with many good deeds in honor of the 30th anniversary of our republic their will and readiness to strengthen and to guard peace and socialism. Working under the slogan: CD-Initiative GDR 30--For a Dependable Protection of Life and the Achievements of Our Socialist Fatherland!" the leadership organs, active forces and institutions of Civil Defense have posed demanding competitive goals to guarantee a high degree of readiness at all times. The challenge to all formations and institutions came from the active forces of the CD in Weisswasser Kreis, headed by the veteran commander, Comrade Meckelburg. The competition is to include the fulfillment of training programs with high participation and to the required extent without detriment to the economic plan fulfillments of the plants; a competition for the evaluation "very good"; the dismantling of buildings designated for demolition with the framework of training exercises with a consequent saving of 20,000 marks; and the performance of 10 hours of voluntary labor by every member of the detachment for the development of training areas. The formation is competing for the title of best unit.

Such obligations have also been assumed by the formations of the CD intelligence system of Brieskow-Finkenheerd community in Eisenhuettenstadt-Land Kreis. In a call addressed to all similar collectives they have, for example, set the goal of raising their degree of readiness by regular, realistic training on their free time to a high level; to take an active part in recruitment; and to support through their sponsorship defense

instruction at the Dr. Salvador Allende Secondary School in their community. In this way they bear witness to their firm ties and loyalty to the leadership of the SED and the state, and contribute to the honorable fulfillment of the tasks set by the Ninth SED Congress regarding the development of civil defense. Your party comrade Arno Kuhncke, teacher, communal deputy and the chief of a CD laboratory is among the signatories of that appeal.

Rescue Efforts After Accidents and Catastrophes

NZ: Could you give some examples of the benefit of the deployment and training of CD formations to the national economy?

Maj Gen Dr Fischer: In this connection I would first of all like to direct attention to the deployment of CD formations in the alleviation of accidents and catastrophes within enterprises and territories. Especially in the north of our country thousands of CD volunteers distinguished themselves at the beginning of this year fighting natural disasters, saving human lives and maintaining or restoring transportation and production.

Obligations accounted for to date in honor of the 30th anniversary of the GDR show that more than 3 million hours of work have been donated by members and volunteers of civil defense to secure better conditions for training, for the storage, maintenance and repair of equipment and machines, and for other purposes outside the regular work hours. The benefits to the national economy amount to the considerable sum of 15 million marks.

A distinguished part in this was played by the women and girls of the CD, whose number amounts to more than a quarter of a honorific volunteer cadres. They all deserve gratitude and recognition.

Trusting Conversations of Deputies With Their Voters Regarding Tasks of CD

NZ: Local people's representations and their councils are responsible for the actions of CD within their territory. How can deputies further the effectiveness of Civil Defense?

Maj Gen Dr Fischer: With their decisions, local people's representations make important determinations in the area of Civil Defense. Together with committees of the National Front and all social cadres they have a leading role in their implementation. Practice has shown that the success of CD depends to a decisive degree on the actions of every deputy. Our deputies, including many members of your party, successfully explain in trusting conversations with the voters the basic questions of our socialist military policy, the necessity to view the defense of socialism as a task of the entire nation. They strengthen the conviction that the socialist fatherland and the common work deserve to be defended, and they recruit citizens to the Civil Defense as well as to the fulfillment of their tasks. In the preparation for basic decisions regarding social development in the territories that people's representations and their councils take into account the demands of Civil Defense for the protection of our citizens and the

national economy. They initiate the execution of the determined tasks in the enterprises, cooperatives and institutions, and exercise control over that execution.

By this action, but also by active participation in the leadership organs, cadres and institutions of the Civil Defense, many deputies make an immediate contribution to assure that the demanding goals for the development of Civil Defense as part of the fulfillment of the decisions of the Ninth SED Congress are being met ever better in all segments of our society.

Members of the NDPD Contribute to the Strengthening of Civil Defense

NZ: Citizens of all classes and segments are volunteers in the Civil Defense. Could you say some words in this connection regarding the deployment of members of our party within CD formations?

Maj Gen Dr Fischer: Because of the basic nature and the main tasks of the GDR Civil Defense thousands of citizens of our country--men, women, youths, workers, collective farmers, artisans and shopkeepers, intellectuals and members of other professions take part in the various areas of civil defense without regard to their world views, party membership or religious ties. Thus they make a conscious decision for our socialist state and work actively for the assuring of peace and the defense of socialism.

They include numerous members of your party who have achieved high levels within the leadership organs, cadres and institutions of the CD, and who have proven their will for action and their action readiness in training, exercises and in deployment.

I would like to name a few members of the NDPD as representatives of many. Your party comrade Heinz Spremberg has since 1963 been the deputy commander for logistics within a CD formation in Rostock Bezirk. Party comrade Hans Grueschow has for 14 years been a volunteer in a leadership organ of Civil Defense of Gadebusch Kreis. Party comrade Rudolf Scholtysick has served since 1967 as platoon leader of a supply platoon in Brandenburg Kreis. His distinguished achievements were rewarded with the medal for Civil Defense service

Many party comrades take an active part in the solving of Civil Defense problems in their roles as government officials. Included here is party comrade Wolfgang Stock, mayor and chief of Civil Defense of Frohnau community in Annaberg Kreis.

The mission readiness of the members of your party within the CD is reflected in the letters received by the NATIONAL-ZEITUNG within the campaign "Birthday Greetings--NZ readers write on the occasion of the 30th anniversary." It should not be overlooked that many members of your party, artisans and shopkeepers, employees, engineers, teachers and scientists have been honored for their exemplary achievements for the strengthening of the Civil Defense

of the GDR with the medal for services in the Civil Defense or have been awarded the medal for faithful service in Civil Defense for their long-term services.

The Eleventh NDPD Congress reaffirmed the responsibility of all members of your party for the strengthening of our socialist defense as an expression of the party's position toward socialism and against imperialism. In the name of the chief of Civil Defense of the GDR, Comrade Lieut Gen Fritz Peter I have to stress here that all members of your party who have distinguished themselves in Civil Defense deserve gratitude and recognition.

Propagation of CD Basic Information in Enterprises, Cooperatives and Residential Areas

NZ: Civil Defense is the concern of every citizen. What importance does the propagation of basic CD information have?

Maj Gen Dr Fischer: The distribution of basic CD information is designed to give every citizen basic knowledge for protection and for correct action in danger situations. This training is to assure that they will be able to take independent measures for individual protection and for the implementation of collective protective measures, as well as to contribute to measures designed to assure protection of production within their places of residence, residential areas, enterprises and cooperatives; behave appropriately in danger situations during and after attacks, and will execute first aid measures after catastrophes and military actions. Moreover, in view of the continuing aggressiveness of imperialism and the perilous armaments policy of NATO the propagation of basic information is also designed to explain to our citizens the need for our increased defensive readiness--to include the organization of civil defense--as an objective requirement of international class struggle that is of deep personal interest to every citizen.

The value of the training of citizens is further enhanced by the fact that a realization of CD basic knowledge as a combination of training and education is today of great importance. It contributes to averting accidents and disasters and counteracts them; it is part of health education of our citizens and fosters measures against fires.

The propagation of basic knowledge regarding civil defense in all plants, combines and residential areas is thus an important step toward a further strengthening of our Civil Defense.

9240
CSO: 2300

HALASZ ON PLAN TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES IN WEST EUROPE

AU241538 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 21 Oct 79 p 2 AU

[Article by Gyorgy Halasz: "Dangerous Plans To Upset the Equilibrium; Why Exactly the Pershing II?"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union and the United States would implement identical limitations, limitations of an equal scale, under SALT, but the dangers threatening the two countries are not the same. For instance, SALT does not apply to the West European nuclear force and disregards France's 64 missiles launchable from submarines, 40 mirage planes and 18 ballistic missiles and Great Britain's 64 missiles launchable from submarines and 48 planes equipped with nuclear weapons, planes that can reach the Soviet Union's territory.

Not only in this respect are the equal framework figures unequal but in a yearbook of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies which is known for its negative stand vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it is stressed that 1)--the Soviet central nuclear systems are not aimed at West Europe, and 2)--"one-fourth of the Soviet air force and nuclear force is on the eastern front and, in view of the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations, its employment in the west, in case of a European war, is improbable." And yet, consistent references are being made to a Soviet threat....

Apart from that, it is also known that the Soviet Union has undertaken a limitation of a larger scale under SALT. While the ratio of strategic delivery systems was 1 to 1.4 in its favor in 1972 (2,358, as against the United State's 1,742 delivery systems), under the new treaty it has accepted an equal number of delivery systems. This means a 10-percent reduction for the Soviet Union. It is natural that concessions have been made also by the U.S. side. However, this applies in the case of any compromise agreement.

It was a significant consideration of the Soviet approach that the Soviet Union regards SALT II "only" as an interim measure, as a step that does not halt, but, nevertheless, curbs the arms race and is conducive to intensifying the atmosphere of trust and elaboration of new and more vigorous measures. This atmosphere of trust is now threatened by the new U.S. plans.

Naturally, a response is being referred to once more with respect to the intended deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Europe, a response to the modern SS-20-type medium-range Soviet missiles. After all, however, there is a vast difference, and not only because of the factor noted by the Strategic Studies Institute. The effective range of Pershing II is almost three times the range of the Pershing I it would replace, amounting to 1,700 kilometers, so that it is amply suitable for being used for a first strike against a large part of the Soviet Union's European areas. In contrast, the aforementioned Soviet missiles are not capable of reaching the United States and are, therefore, not of a strategic character.

A similar situation prevails with regard to the Cruise missile as well, of which models launchable from the air, sea and ground alike have been designed. Its serial production could begin at the beginning of the eighties, following the expiry of the limiting SALT protocol.

There is no doubt that, placed in West Europe, this weapon also could be classified as one of a strategic character as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. This explains the sternness of the warnings being made by the Soviet side: actually, an evasion of SALT II is involved, since, even if the U.S. step does not contravene the letter of the treaty, it is, in any case, at variance with its spirit and diminishes its value. General Sergey Akhromeyev, first deputy to the chief of the Soviet staff, has let it be known in a statement that the U.S. step is viewed as a qualitatively new strategic development aimed at changing the balance of power. "The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent," he said, "but is obliged to implement appropriate military countermeasures."

For the time being, Washington's plans are being met rather sceptically in West Europe. As Brzezinski has revealed in an interview granted to DER STERN, the concept calls for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Italy, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain and the FRG. The emphasis would be placed on the last-named country.

For this reason, the smaller NATO countries are adopting a rather wait-and-see attitude. For its own part, the Bonn Government is evidently guarding against only two countries--the United States and the FRG--remaining under the NATO emblem on the issue and, regarding the risks as too high, wants a certain division of the responsibility. According to indications, if other countries entered into it, the FRG would not be averse to accepting the Pershing II missiles. As for others--they are looking to others still....

This caution and these qualms are very wellfounded indeed. It is difficult to find a justification for poisoning the international situation and initiating a new round of the arms race under circumstances where the other side stresses its good intentions and provides such tangible proof for them as the Soviet initiative announced in Berlin, the unilateral reduction of armed forces in

Central Europe. And the Soviet Union would also reduce the quantity of the medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western area--if additional weapons of similar kind are not placed in West Europe.

Thus, the NATO decision due in December will have considerably more than a military-technological significance and will throw light on the future of detente as well. Which way from the crossroads?--this is the question that it will answer. To be sure, the Pershing II is not merely one of the many threatening weapons.

CSO: 2500

AVAR ON NATO ARMAMENT DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS

AU230923 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 21 Oct 79 p 7 AU

[Article by Karoly Avar: "Peace With Weapons, or a Peaceful State Without Weapons?"]

[Excerpt] It goes without saying that it is difficult for two potential adversaries confronting each other, concerned for their security and not trusting each other, adversaries who, consequently, constantly crave guarantees and tangible safeguards, to find suitable forms and means in implementing their mutually asserted intention to disarm. Neither can lunge forward too far unilaterally, because it would reduce his own level of security and make it difficult to find a suitable scale of reciprocity. It is no coincidence that both sides have been stressing for a good while that genuine results require political understanding and good intentions and, therefore, a favorable atmosphere of trust.

Well, can it be seen in any other way than as a gesture intended to enhance trust when one side steps forward unilaterally? Of course it can only be to an extent that precludes harming one's own security. No one has claimed--the Soviet leaders least of all--that the Berlin proposals held out the prospects of a decisive modification of the military balance of power. That was not their purpose, but rather to prove once more that, now as before, the Soviet Union is prepared to advance in the area of disarmament. That is the very reason that confronts the hundreds of suspicious and doubtful voices heard in the West with the question: what is to prevent the United States from making a similar gesture? One, say, by reducing armaments about which it feels superior. To be sure, such a thing has not happened in past decades, although it is common knowledge that for part of the 35 years that have elapsed since the war, the United States had a military superiority over the Soviet Union and, therefore, it would have had thousands of opportunities to prove that it is prepared to disarm, without endangering its security.

Still, the picture would not be realistic if we emphasized only insinuating and accusatory commentaries and statements.

Common sense, too, has manifested itself in the reaction of some leading politicians in the most important NATO countries. With good reason, they have

now cautioned that the ball is in the court of the western alliance which imposes on it the responsibility of whether the game is to continue.

"The NATO countries must not miss the opportunities offered, following the Soviet proposals, to accelerate the European military detente process," Willy Brandt, chairman of the West German government party, cautioned, for instance.

However, the main protagonists beyond the Atlantic are of a different opinion. Although U.S. President Carter and mainly Brzezinski, his adviser on national security, have paid tribute to "certain positive features" of the Soviet initiatives, they emphatically hastened to point out that NATO must arm first and only afterwards negotiate. What Washington has in view is the fact that in December the NATO Council of Ministers will have to decide the issue of deploying new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe.

The plan involving some 600 nuclear delivery vehicles is of special interest to NATO and what the attackers of the Berlin proposals are shouting out is that the Soviet Union's new initiative is intended to prevent that plan. And of course they are entirely right in that. In his speech, Leonid Brezhnev has left no doubt that the Soviet Union would like to prevent the implementation of the NATO plan. That is understandable because from the territory of Great Britain, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, missiles can be delivered 2,000-3,000 kilometers away and endanger European areas of key importance to the Soviet Union. And it is obvious that the Soviet leadership would have to implement measures to counter that.

Thus, the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Europe would unequivocally initiate a new wave in the arms race, as several experts have pointed out in the NATO countries as well. For instance, Italian General Pasti, former deputy commander of European NATO forces, has made the following appraisal: "Upsetting the strategic equilibrium between the two great powers, the Pershing II and Cruise missiles themselves encourage a further arms race because in response to the U.S. steps, it is quite natural for the Soviet Union to be forced to take the necessary measures." The veteran Italian officer can hardly be claimed to represent Soviet interests, yet his professional appraisal is conspicuously similar to the view of General of the Army Akhromeyev, deputy to the Soviet chief of staff: "The deployment of 600 new delivery vehicles to West Europe cannot be regarded as a modernization of armaments, but would be a qualitatively new strategic development that would change the balance of power."

However, leading NATO circles, primarily the Americans, argue that the European strategic equilibrium has been upset by the Soviet Union's deployment of the so-called SS-20 missiles, which, through their 4,000-kilometer range, can reach practically any target in West Europe. By western reasoning, that would be compensated for by the 600 new U.S. missiles in 5 NATO countries. Brzezinski and others are scaring public opinion precisely by the allegation

that the Soviet Union "is deploying an SS-20 missile in its European areas every 6 days." And from that they unequivocally conclude that the military equilibrium has been upset on our continent and that, indeed, the disadvantage of the western military alliance is rapidly increasing. It has also been said that the Soviet Union would not have offered to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles were it not aware of its superiority, otherwise it would jeopardize its own security.

That argumentation disregards one single factor of fundamental importance, namely the fact that strategic equilibrium between two great powers does not mean that parity must exist between each single component. Understandably, continental military parity is the most important factor for West Europe. In case of a war, however, not only, not even primarily, is Europe the theater that decides everything because regarding military parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, their geographical conditions and related relations of alliance cannot be disregarded. To be sure, the Soviet Union can only reach U.S. targets with its intercontinental missiles, which are limited under SALT II. However, the United States would threaten the Soviet Union from short range if the U.S. medium-range weapons were deployed in West Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union does not have a base in the vicinity of the American continent. Therefore, not only would Washington change military conditions in Europe, but it would evade the prohibitions of the new SALT Treaty and upset global strategic parity as well. It is natural that the Soviet Union cannot agree to that and that it must defend itself against it.

Also on the occasion, the offer to negotiate was the first phase of Soviet defense. Moscow hopes that it will not be obliged to enter a new round in the arms race. And it has supplemented the highly significant proposal on missiles with an important military measure, a measure the scale of which is also significant. A withdrawal of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the GDR is more than the western countries proposed for mutual reduction at the Vienna troop reduction talks. Of course, the well-known counterarguments were ready: the Soviet Union has a superiority of 150,000 soldiers and a few thousand tanks in the area in any case. As opposed to that no one mentions in the great propaganda campaign for instance that--as is also recognized in the West, that is, not only according to unilateral allegations--NATO has superiority in the number of nuclear warheads in central Europe. Let us again cite general Pasti: "Some 8,000 nuclear warheads are already deployed in West Europe and, according to realistic calculations, that exceeds the quantity of similar weapons deployed in the European part of the Soviet Union."

Thus, the question of who has superiority is answered only in one particular way at the NATO bastions and particularly in the U.S. capital, for only repeated references to the superiority of the adversary can justify new waves of armament. There is also another trump card, which is played with predilection: insuring a deterrent force. Whatever happens, Washington would like to discuss disarmament in possession of hat, that is, in possession of its own superiority.

To be sure, greatly intensifying production and deployment of weapons not banned by the treaty for instance seems more and more to be the price set for accepting SALT II in the United States. That is well demonstrated by the rapid increase of the U.S. military budget and the intense pressure exerted on NATO partners. Thus, peace with weapons is offered, instead of a peaceful state without weapons. The former involves intensifying armament and the latter, reduction of weapons. Which is better? That question must now be answered by the West European governments and the United States. Undoubtedly, the future of mankind as a whole depends on the answer.

CSO: 2500

COMMENTATOR EXPECTS CARTER-KENNEDY 'DUEL' FOR NOMINATION

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 22 Oct 79 p 3

[Article by Witold Olszewski]

[Text] One of the recent issues of the American weekly NEWSWEEK had the following on the cover: against the background of a badly cracked stone carving of Jimmy Carter's head stands Edward Kennedy, smiling from ear to ear, with a chisel and hammer in his hand. The viewer has no doubts about his intentions: he will complete the destruction of that sculpture.

The preelection period in the United States began with the moment when President Carter announced, in a speech made in New York, that he intends to be a candidate again and that, if Senator Kennedy has the same intention, he would compete with him. This is what is called putting things clearly. One cannot say the same thing about Kennedy, who for at least a year has been weaving and simpering like a marriageable maiden. He himself supposedly does not really want to run, but others are putting such strong pressure on him. Recently even his mother and wife finally expressed agreement with the candidacy of the last inheritor of a tragic generation of Kennedys. So now he can run without impediments, but he does not really want to create grief for his party colleagues. (Both Carter and Kennedy are members of the Democratic Party.)

In the meantime, committees supporting Kennedy's candidacy "just in case" are being created throughout the country. It is difficult to resist such pressure from the will of the people. Many journalists were witnesses to the following scene: When Kennedy, in New York, got out of an automobile, a young man looking like a physical laborer came up to him, greeted him, and said "Good morning, Mr President." Carter himself, in one of his most recent speeches, slipped and referred to him as President Kennedy, rather than Senator Kennedy, doubtlessly out of the habit of referring to his assassinated brother, John, in this way. Truth to tell, he broke off in mid-word, but the whole of America heard this error.

Ted's weaving and temporizing is a deft tactical maneuver. By not pushing for power, he does not expose himself to the accusation that he is

breaking up the unity of the Democratic Party. It is easy for him to take such a position, because already twice during previous elections he refused to run and yielded to the opposition of his mother and wife, who are panic-stricken in their fear of an attempt on the life of the third Kennedy. Not without influence on his decision was the fresh memory of the question-ridden misfortune which had also occurred to him: During a dark night his car fell from a bridge into a stream, and the senator was so busy frenziedly saving himself that he did not have the time to save his colleague and passenger, who drowned because of this. Ten years have now passed since this affair and one can expect that time and dissatisfaction with Carter's actions have had their effect.

I would not be so sure of that. This episode has returned to the columns of the press. When President Carter, in one of his speeches, praised himself for not panicking in any situation, he then wrote a very polite letter to Senator Kennedy in which he assured him that he did not have the tragic accident at Chappaquiddick on his mind. I do not know whether to be more amazed at the courtesy or the perfidiousness of this. The biggest nail was stuck into Kennedy by Carter's famous mama, Lillian, when she said that she hopes that "nothing happens" to that nice man Ted. Kennedy himself said that he would make his decision no earlier than November, when he will be acquainted with whether the country's economic situation is still getting worse. Then he will be ready to replace Carter as candidate in order to save the Democratic Party's chances in the upcoming elections. What will a man not do for the commonwealth?

In other words, we have to expect a stubborn, although cosmetically powdered, duel between the two democratic candidates.

I completely disagree, however, with the artist of the NEWSWEEK cover that Kennedy will, beyond any doubt, destroy Jimmy. A man who has at his disposal the office of President, the official apparatus of power, open access to television, press conferences, and so on, has, if he knows how to use these tools, a massive and effective preelection weapon. What is most important, especially in Carter's case, a cost-free weapon. Second, all of Carter's real and alleged errors and deficiencies can be more than made up for by his undeniable genius for getting votes. He proved this 3 years ago, when, as the nationally unknown governor of the small state of Georgia, he overcame all other candidates, although he really had no support and no wealth. He became President in spite of the party apparatus and surrounded himself with a crowd of young men, mostly provincial bumpkins.

This act could be repeated. Truth to tell, according to studies and polls Carter is at the bottom of his popularity (about 20 percent of the electors support him, while over 40 percent back Kennedy), but we know well that one fortunate move or achievement could raise him to the mountaintops. Only not too soon before the elections, which are still over a year away. It is true that the Democratic Party convention which

is to select the party's candidate for the elections will take place in the summer of the coming year. But that too is still a long time away. In the meantime Ted's beauty and the magical influence of the Kennedy name must go through the test of the ungrateful role of oppositionist to a President from his own party....

There have been instances in which a sitting president lost to another candidate at a party convention. This [almost] happened, for example, to the previous president, Ford, who [nearly] lost to Ronald Reagan. This is, however, very rare. In that case the man involved was the first president in the history of the United States who was not elected, but appointed. I remind you of what happened: Both President Nixon and Vice President Agnew had to resign. Before Nixon resigned he had to select a vice president, whom the Senate confirmed. This vice president was Gerald Ford.

Jimmy Carter, on the other hand, was elevated into power by the multitudes of those who had had enough of the "schemers from Washington." His failures can to a large extent be explained by the hostile relationship of the exigencies [sic] from Congress toward the "diletante" from the provinces. At least this is how he will explain it to his voters. Will they believe him?

In addition to that, one must look at American events from the point of view of the institutional conflict between executive and legislative power. The fall of Nixon was a dramatic manifestation of this. Carter's case is a deviation in the opposite direction, but I would like to write about that some other time.

Returning to the subject, I repeat: I do not agree with the judgment of the weekly NEWSWEEK that Carter's fate has been predetermined by the Kennedy candidacy. These are pia desideria, or pious wishes.

CSO: 2600

WEST LOATH TO RESPOND TO BREZHNEV BERLIN PROPOSALS

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 19 Oct 79 p 2 AU

/Commentary by Col W. Zielinski: "The Old Positions"/

[Text] NATO and Beijiing have been in full agreement in their views for many years now, and in many cases Beijing has assumed an even more extreme position than the west vis-a-vis all the peace initiatives put forward by the socialist states. The Chinese leaders' attitude toward the CSCE was and is an eloquent example of that.

In such a situation no one is in the least surprised that Beijing is inciting the West against Comrade L. Brezhnev's Berlin proposals. The following quotation from the PEOPLE'S DAILY is enough to illustrate that: "Brezhnev's proposals should be rejected because they seek to endanger western Europe's unity by blackmail and threats. It is obvious that the Russians want no genuine peace; what they want is to obtain the mastery of western Europe and to subject peace to their own control." As the AFP Press Agency noted, the fact that that commentary had been published on the eve of Hua Guofeng's departure for western Europe is extremely significant.

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns also tried to deny the importance of the Soviet proposals. He was quoted by the NEWSWEEK as saying that even if the Soviet Union withdraws 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks... "it will always retain its superiority."

As you see, neither the Beijing CENTRAL DAILY nor Joseph Luns, who even last spring claimed that there was a power equilibrium between east and West, have taken too much notice of their lack of logic. The PEOPLE'S DAILY rates the Soviet Union's proposals s "blackmail and threats" and an "attempt to gain the mastery of western Europe" and Joseph Luns and other "Atlanticians" would certainly claim that the Soviet army "has superiority" even if its numerical strength were no more than three soldiers. After all, it is common knowledge that the NATO people dream not only of changing the present balance of conventional and nuclear weapons to their advantage, but also of obtaining a far-reaching superiority. The AP Press Agency vividly illustrated that position when on 14 October it cited Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's statement: "NATO will continue to

strengthen its arsenal of medium-to-long range nuclear missiles until the Soviet Union agrees 'to return to the zero position' in this area of its armaments."

Against that background the evaluations of the Soviet Union's proposals by people such as French foreign minister Jean Francois Poncet and former FRG Chancellor Willi Brandt acquire a positive distinction.

The position of many Western representatives who have minimized or denied the significance of L. Brezhnev's proposals is unequivocal proof that they have been taken by surprise. That is because the proposals have disorganized NATO's entire plan for intensifying armaments on the pretext of modernizing nuclear weapons, with which they would like to cover all western Europe to the accompaniment of great noises on the subject of the growing superiority of the east, especially the Soviet Union. That plan has been carefully elaborated since the NATO session in Washington. The scheme was also to be aided by halting the Vienna negotiations under the fictitious pretext of the "inaccuracy of the figures" supplied by the Warsaw Pact states. NATO was convinced that within a short time it could assure superiority for itself by increasing and modernizing the U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe--at present some 8,000 nuclear warheads, each of which is several times more powerful than those dropped on Japanese cities during World War II. Aside from modernization, the American plan provides for supplying the bases in Great Britain, the FRG, Belgium and Holland with 464 self-guiding cruise missiles and 100 Pershing II missiles of a new type. Poland, Czechoslovakia and large areas of the Soviet Union are within the range of those missiles.

In view of such a situation the Soviet proposals were ill-timed insofar as NATO was concerned, all the more so since they were shored up by a specific decision on reducing the number of the Soviet troops and hardware in the GDR. The illogical evaluation of those proposals by the NATO cold war circles and their enmeshment in their own statements and pseudo-argumentation is precisely proof of confusion in those circles. After all, many such circles have kept saying officially and with all seriousness: "We are waiting for the east's first specific gesture to prove its good will to strengthen trust." In agreement with its Warsaw Pact partners such a gesture was made by the Soviet Union in a specific manner of considerable significance. That is why, in order not to strengthen the Western societies' doubts in the credibility and sincerity of the leaders, the West should also respond specifically and back its response with tangible proof. However, the West does not want to give up its efforts to promote a new nuclear arms race, as attested to by the mad slogan: "Let us first reinforce our armaments and then talk with the east about disarmament."

In a commentary TASS has expressed the hope that "the West will this time respond to the offer and will agree to constructively examine the problems of reducing and curbing armaments." At the same time, [illegible] warned the West not to try one's patience by threatening to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe. That is because the socialist states will in no case permit any change in the equilibrium of power in favor of the Atlantic Treaty, which would certainly take advantage of such a change.

CSO: 2600

SITUATION OF LEFTWING FORCES IN IRAN VIEWED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 17 Oct 79 p 7 AU

[Article by Jan Urbaniak: "Iran--The Long Road to Stability"; passage between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpt] The Unfinished Struggle

The leftwing, which enjoys a considerable influence among Iranian people, but which is still in a state of disruption, has been subjected to many acts of repression on the part of government authorities in the past few months. That is why it is criticizing a number of aspects of the policy pursued by the Islamic Revolutionary Council's government. At the same time, however, it has not given up its efforts in favor of cooperation among all anti-imperialist forces.

/In that context the communists continue to point out that the movements around the Islamic Revolutionary Council has freed Iran from its commitment as an imperialist guardian of the Persian Gulf and has committed the country to the policy of nonalinement. It has also brought about the nationalization of the processing industries, banks and insurance companies./

At the same time, the leftwing has stressed that progressive forces should be ready for any contingencies involved in the further development of the situation in Iran. Even such events as Bakhtiar's predictions, circulated by the Western press, that Khomeini's influence would be eroded within 6-8 months and that he--Bakhtiar--would return to Iran as prime minister make it imperative to bear in mind, the Communist MARDOM has written, that the struggle for Iran's independent development is not yet over.

CSO: 2600

'TRYBUNA' ON BREZHNEV'S YEARS AS CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY

[Editorial Report] Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on 13-14 October on page 2 carries a 1,300-word editorial article praising the 15 years of L. Brezhnev's work as CPSU General Secretary as a "period of not only unceasing successes of the Soviet people in communist construction but also the enormous upsurge of the socialist policy of peace." The daily traces Brezhnev's achievements in international policy, including the "transformations in Soviet-American relations" and the recent Berlin proposals on disarmament, and stresses his "service to peace and socialism in their indivisible unity."

The daily writes: "The Soviet leader's words that it is impossible to build peace upon stacks of arms have resounded extensively throughout the world, and the policy of the USSR and the entire socialist community--a policy resulting from that obvious truth--has been responsible for a clear increase in the importance of disarmament problems in the past few years, both in the political thinking of world nations and in world diplomacy."

CSO: 2600

BRIEFS

TPPR AKTIV MEETING--PAP--In connection with the inauguaration of the new cultural year on 12 October 1979, an all-Polish meeting of the cultural aktiv was held at the Main Board of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship (TPPR). The topic at the meeting was the discussion of TPPR tasks in popularizing Soviet culture and art in the present cultural year and also the developing of Polish-Soviet cultural cooperation in light of the tasks advanced at the Tenth National Congress of the society [TPPR]. In connection with the 35th anniversary in April 1980, of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Polish People's Republic and the USSR "Soviet Culture Days" will be held in Poland. The participation of the TPPR in the organization of that largest event next year and popularizing Soviet culture and art were discussed. The activists from the entire country presented interesting local initiatives at the conference worthy of popularization on a broader scale. The meeting was conducted by the chairman of the culture commission of the Main Board of the TPPR, the First Vice Minister of Culture and Art, Wieslaw Bek. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13-14 Oct 79 p 4]

VICE PREMIER, CYCLISTS--The Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Prof Tadeusz Pyka, received the Polish cyclist team [members] along with its trainer, Andrzej Trochanowski, who were silver medal winners at the 1979 world championships of amateur cyclists on the roads. Preparation of the cyclists for the olympics in Moscow was discussed. Marian Renke, chairman of the Main Committee for Physical Culture and Sports (GKKFiS), also took part in the meeting. [Text] [Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 23 Oct 79 p 8]

HEALTH SERVICE PROBLEMS--The title of the lecture which Dr. Jerzy Hagmajer gave last Monday [22 October 1979] at the meeting of the Polish Branch of the European Society of Culture (SEC) was, "Medical Problems in the Eyes of the Practicing Physician." Such a title could suggest that the reflections of Dr. Hagmajer will be meant mainly for medical groups and that he will concentrate on very specialized problems. It was, however, quite to the contrary--in the address, we received a precise analysis of the fundamental problems with which the health service is currently struggling as well as an analysis of the consequences of their existence for the health state of our society. He also devoted much attention to the ethics of the

medical profession and the moral dilemma, which is not easy to resolve, which faces the doctor who does not have an adequate quantity of resources at his disposal which are indispensable in giving aid to all patients entrusted to him. Dr. Hagmajer's lecture met with a lively reaction from those attending the meeting. We are not all doctors but we are all interested in this that the conditions under which the health service is operating be the best possible--every one of us has been, is, or will be a patient. [Text] [Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 26 Oct 79 p 6]

CSO: 2600

'SCINTEIA' COMMENTARY URGES GREATER EFFORT FOR DISARMAMENT

Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1832 GMT 25 Oct 79 AU

[AGERPRES headline: "For Concrete Disarmament Measures"]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 25 Oct--The achievement of disarmament is in Romania's outlook a sine quanon of development and peace in the world. An active contribution to its achievement should be made by all peoples, governments of all countries--big, medium-sized and small--irrespective of their economic or military potential, the people's masses, international public opinion.

Evoking this position of principle of Romania as regards the settlement of one of the cardinal issues of contemporary world, the Romanian press of today stresses the role of outstanding importance incumbent on the UN in the disarmament negotiations, a fact highlighted in fact also by the United Nations special session. Pointing to it, SCINTEIA writes: The idea permanently backed by Romania, namely that the UN offers the most suitable framework, has major responsibilities and the possibility to lend greater efficiency to the whole activity of debate and settlement of the disarmament issue has thus been consecrated.

Mentioning in this context the importance of the UN special session, the same daily opines in its commentary on the United Nations week for disarmament, that it would be a big error to consider that once the session ended the peoples, the forces declaring for the cause of disarmanent and peace may lessen their efforts. More than ever, sustained efforts are necessary internationally, for disarmament. The more so as the spiral of arming, the competition for supremacy in the domain of destruction means have kept on at a steady pace.

As it is known, highlighting permanently the serious consequences, the great dangers spelt at mankind by the arms race, Romania firmly declares for a switch over to concrete, efficient measures on disarmament. This position materializes in an intense political and diplomatic activity and initiatives. Romania advanced to the UN in 1975 and after that, at the UN special session, a document regarding her position on disarmament, a document stipulating

measures for the freezing and gradual reduction of military expenditures, of military effectives and weapons, the withdrawal of the foreign troops to within the national frontiers, the dismantling of the military bases, the beginning of negotiations for the concomitant abolition of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the creation of denuclearized zones in the Balkans and other regions of the world.

In parallel to these political-diplomatic initiatives, Romania adopted the decision not to augment the share earmarked to arming out of the national income.

Campaigning for disarmament measures, Romania also greeted and will greet any measure, any contribution of a nature to serve the progress in disarmament. In keeping with this desideratum, she declared for the adoption of even unilateral initiatives aimed at military disengagement and disarmament, expressing her hope that such actions would be followed by other states as well, contributing to an wide-embracing process in this direction.

CSO: 2020

FAILURE ON EXAM ATTRIBUTED TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Bucharest FEMEIA in Romanian No 9, Sep 79 p 21

[Article by Sanda Faur: "An Acatist, a Bigoted Grandmother and the Drama of an Adolescent"]

[Text] It was only after 2 days that they found the girl at the North Station, several hundred kilometers from home. She was dressed in her school uniform with bag in hand, just as she had been when she left the notice board where she found out that she had not "passed," that she would not go on to the 11th grade. Pale and drawn--she had eaten almost nothing in 48 hours--the girl appeared wild, did not want to talk with anyone, would not answer any questions and it was only because of her exhaustion--especially mental, from the trauma which she had been through--that she offered no resistance to the militiaman who brought her home. Here there was despair, endless quarreling, bitter mutual blaming: mother accused father of not being strict enough with her; father blamed mother for not carefully supervising her and watching how she studied; and they both blamed grandmother for "putting such foolishness into her head." "What foolishness? Mother, [of God] don't sin or the Almighty will punish you worse," retorted the old lady, crossing herself, "that I taught her to be pious and to believe in God, to go to church, to know that there is help from heaven in time of need. What is wrong with that?"

When she entered the house, Marilena F. didn't want to talk with anyone. She went to her room and locked herself in. In the room in which she had lived with her grandmother all her childhood, where she had learned to say the "Our Father" every night in front of the icon, "so that God will help you get a 10 on the test tomorrow," the old woman convincingly assured her. But now, around the time of the "promotion" the diplomatic negotiations with God intensified. Every day Marilena piously ate the Eucharist wafer brought from church and she fasted on Fridays. She went to church and three times requested an "acatist" [Orthodox ceremony requesting fulfillment of a particular desire], each time slipping a message into the priest's hand, along with a 10 lei note, in which the "handmaiden of God" clearly explained to Him that the subjects she would want were physics and chemistry and making it clear that she had paid the price for each intervention.

And the subject was chosen according to a flawless system: you pray silently --the longest prayer that you know--then quickly open the chemistry textbook or, let's say, the physics one. Wherever the book falls open, that's where you would fail the exam, that's what you study. The rest doesn't matter: if you believe, you will pass, she was assured by the old woman who, poor thing, in her distant youth, had not managed to learn any more than to sign her name with great difficulty.

Marilena believed. But she did not pass. The topics of the exam were either a few pages before or a few pages after the place where the covers of the book had happened to fall open. The shock had been terrible: the girl, by nature obedient, sensitive, dutiful, had completely lost the belief in her own strengths. She saw herself faced with failure. She was disoriented. Her "idols" had been destroyed by an indisputable reality. She was overcome with despair. She was ashamed of failing like that. She had decided to throw herself in front of a train. But the vitality of her 16 years won out and she got on the train instead, but without a ticket... Only after many months did the girl regain her equilibrium and learn, little by little, to come back to life and to believe in herself...

I heard the above story in a northern city from Marilena herself, and from her mother, a typist in the same institute where her husband works in supply. The mother acknowledged that she had sent her daughter--at the urging of the grandmother, it's true--to catechism for years: twice a week several children from the district went to church in the morning before school and the priest taught them religious theory and practice. "We thought that it wouldn't hurt her to know a little bit from the old books, that she would be more obedient at home if she had a belief in God," explained her mother, embarrassed. But these children heard one thing from the Bible stories and another thing at school, from the scientific truths. In more than a few of them this led to a mental confusion, to an internal exhaustion, even to a certain mental imbalance. Marilena's case is only one of the possibilities--and not one of the most serious--but it is valid and an evident sign of alarm. She puts herself, she put us, all of us and the parents, in the front ranks of this great and deeply responsible question: fine, fine, we concern ourselves very much with the colds, with the bread and butter of our children, with the clothes that they wear and the notes that they take at school. We are very ambitious, some even tremble with aspirations to "give-them-everything-they want-and-we-didn't-have," to insure them a future with as much education as possible and as well provided for as possible. But we often don't think enough about how these children are thinking, what existential concepts are they forming? Some grandmother, or a housewife overwhelmed with the cares of a family with many children or of a difficult household, and who didn't manage to learn too much in their time or to understand the scientific mechanisms of the universe, make from their ignorance a strong argument, a dogma which they consider a sacred principle: the stories of the Bible and religious literature are, of course, easier to understand than the principle of relativity or the system of electronic computers. It's true that some parents get complexes in the face of the knowledge assimilated by their children in

school and do not have arguments with which to dominate and control them when the need to contribute to the formation of the children's personality is still strong. And then the handiest thing is the "scourge of God." Dealings with the divinity. "Take from a believer the fear of hell and you will take from him his belief," the great thinker of the Enlightenment, Diderot, said centuries ago. And he added: "The education of childhood makes a Christian believe in Jesus Christ. The education of childhood makes a Turk believe in Mohammed. The education of childhood makes an Indian believe in the incarnations of Vishnu... In all countries belief is nothing but the blind respect for the sentimentality of the priests, who are always infallible where they are the most powerful..."

Certainly we live today in a time and in a world where the philosophical materialistic and revolutionary outlook is strongly and immovably powerful, founded as it is on the scientific truths which penetrated the mind of man when he refused any longer to "believe without thinking" as the religions demanded. Certainly in Romania the beliefs and outlooks of everyone are respected. But Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said it clearly: "Our revolutionary outlook and the obligation of the communist and the party activist to fight for that outlook must not be confused with our state policy, according to which the belief and outlook of everyone is respected." And he urged us all "let's not close our eyes or leave the way clear for reactionary or backward outlooks." An extremely valuable piece of advice and a directive which should stir up a deep echo and agitation of conscience in the minds of all of us, of every parent, of entire families, of the old people, enough of whom--in spite of the wisdom of age--are still prisoners of some backward thoughts, confined by ignorance, inertia and ancient rituals. "And what is wrong with teaching a girl the fear of God? Of teaching a belief that when needed there is someone to confide in or that, if you believe, you can overcome evil with help of the Almighty?" Marilena's grandmother said with sincere conviction. "It is wrong, grandmother," I told her, "because the girl no longer believed in herself. She no longer believed it was necessary to study. She awaited the results of the 'acatist' and a good grade in exchange for the 10 lei and the Friday fasts. And she said: let the Almighty learn for me: if He wants, He will give me exactly the subject that I know"... And this is the business that didn't work, the negotiations with the divinity did not have the results that serious study would have had. And the girl woke up, all at once, without any help at all: especially the help from her soul. Do these parents, however many of them there might be, really want such children? Do they really want to have children without internal strength, without belief in themselves, without the capacity to fight in life and whose ethics accept fear, fear of supernatural powers?

Bigotry, prejudice and religious practice can obstruct a child--as you have seen--in his essential form of activity--learning; what might happen when they are grown? What responsibilities will then weigh on the shoulders and the consciences of their parents? We plan to discuss this in a future issue.

CSO: 2700

LAW ON MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENT, MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 30, 29 Jun 79 pp 962-975

[Law passed by the SFRY Assembly in a session of the Federal Chamber on 27 June 1979]

[Text] I. General Provisions

Article 1

This law shall regulate the conditions and procedure for construction of facilities for production of armament and military equipment; special conditions for the planning and manufacture of armament and military equipment, special conditions and procedure for establishment, organization, combination, termination, change of line of business and other changes in status of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment; conditions and procedure for realizing the particular public interest in the domain of the manufacture of armament and military equipment; special rights and obligations of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and other matters in the domain of manufacturing and domestic sale of armament and military equipment; special conditions with respect to the use, management and disposition of resources intended for manufacture of armament and military equipment, and other matters important to production of armament and military equipment.

Article 2

The manufacturing of armament and military equipment is an activity of particular public interest.

The manufacture of finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, reproduction materials, raw materials and other products and the rendering of services which are of particular importance to the manufacture of armament and military equipment have priority importance.

Article 3

Bodies and agencies of sociopolitical communities shall take the necessary steps in conformity with the provisions of this law and within the limits of their rights and duties set forth by the constitution and law, to ensure the material and other conditions for the manufacture of armament and military equipment for the sake of successful and efficient supply of armament and military equipment of domestic manufacture to the armed forces and other national defense forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Article 4

For the purpose of this law "manufacture of armament and military equipment" means the development of new pieces of equipment and technology and manufacture of weapons and military equipment to equip the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as the "SFRY Armed Forces") and other national defense needs as well as preparations for wartime manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 5

For the purpose of this law "armament and military equipment" means functional sets or systems intended for supply to the SFRY Armed Forces or for other national defense needs, embracing the principal piece of equipment (ship, airplane, tank, vehicle, rifle, radio station, etc.) and the elements which ensure that the set or system can perform its stated function autonomously during the execution of missions (ammunition, explosives, gunpowder, pyrotechnic, smoke and incendiary devices, special electronic devices, optical equipment, etc.), special devices for defense and radiation-biological-chemical protection, units, special tools and accessories, containers for transport and storage; technical specifications and operating instructions.

Article 6

Establishment, incorporation, organization, change of activity, combination, separation and other status changes of organizations of associated labor which manufacture armament and military equipment, the manufacture and domestic sale of armament and military equipment, and the use, management and disposition of the means of manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be performed and programs and plans concerning production, construction and development of the facilities of those organizations shall be adopted under the conditions and in the manner defined by federal law, unless this law states otherwise.

The appointment and dismissal of the professional manager or professional management body of the organizations of associated labor referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be done subject to the provisions of this law.

II. Provisions Concerning Matters Affecting the Status of Organizations of Associated Labor Which Manufacture Armament and Military Equipment

Article 7

The following may engage in the manufacture of armament and military equipment under this law:

1) organizations of associated labor which the Federal Executive Council designates on recommendation of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense as organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment;

2) organizations of associated labor which produce armament and military equipment as part of their principal activity, on the basis of long-term contracts with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense or long-term contracts concerning cooperation with the organizations of associated labor referred to in Subparagraph 1 of this article;

3) organizations of associated labor designated for wartime manufacture of armament and military equipment on the basis of a separate federal law.

Article 8

Organizations of associated labor which manufacture armament and military equipment, as referred to in Article 7, Subparagraph 1, of this law, may establish a work organization for the manufacture of armament and military equipment with the prior consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 9

An organization of associated labor which intends to establish a work organization as referred to in Article 8 of this law must submit to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense a detailed study of the public and economic justifiability of establishing such work organization.

Article 10

The work organization referred to in Article 8 of this law shall be established so as to accomplish a unified process of development and production of armament and military equipment, the necessary engineering and technological level of facilities for development and production of armament and military equipment, and the assurance of economic-legal independence, but with the purpose of guaranteeing the country's defensive capability and equipping the SFRY Armed Forces with armament and military equipment of domestic manufacture.

As a rule the work organization referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall come about through association of basic organizations of associated labor which exclusively or predominantly manufacture armament and military equipment, but in conformity with the provisions of the Law on Associated Labor other basic organizations of associated labor may also enter into such an association provided this does not jeopardize achievement of the goals referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 11

Work organizations which manufacture armament and military equipment may for the sake of specialization, the social division of labor, joint earning of income and pursuit of other joint interests enter into association with other work organizations for the manufacture of armament and military equipment or with other work organizations to form a complex organization of associated labor or other form of pooling labor and capital, provided such association does not jeopardize achievement of the goals stated in Article 10 of this law and realization of the particular public interest in the domain of the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 12

Workers have the right and duty to organize the portion of a work organization which manufactures armament and military equipment as a basic organization of associated labor, if that portion of the work organization constitutes an operating entity in and of itself based on engineering and technological integrity of the facility for production of armament and military equipment, if the manufacture of armament and military equipment in it is efficient and reliable, and if provision is made for manufacture, use and disposition of the facilities and other equipment intended for production of armament and military equipment, in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article 13

Aside from the bases envisaged in Article 333 of the Law on Associated Labor, the assignment of assets, rights and obligations between basic organizations of associated labor which manufacture armament and military equipment and other basic organizations within the same work organization shall also be done on the following bases:

1) assets used entirely or partially for the manufacture of armament and military equipment on the basis of the production program shall be allotted to those basic organizations of associated labor engaged in that production;

2) obligations which do not arise out of business related to the manufacture of armament and military equipment and obligations which do not arise out of joint business operation may not be allocated to basic organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

Article 14

In a work organization which manufactures armament and military equipment a basic organization of associated labor or work community shall be organized to do development work on armament and military equipment.

As an exception to the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article, the development work on armament and military equipment may also be organized within a basic organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

Within a work organization or complex organization of associated labor a basic organization of associated labor shall be organized within the work organization or a work organization shall be established as part of the complex organization of associated labor to perform manufacturing or service activities (power, fluids, forge, toolroom, press shop, maintenance, etc.) which are of particular importance to the manufacture of armament and military equipment and which are of common interest to several basic organizations of associated labor.

Article 15

The social compact concluded by the Federal Executive Council and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall work out in detail the standards and criteria for enforcement of the criteria for organizing basic organizations of associated labor and for establishment of work organizations manufacturing armament and military equipment set forth in this law and other federal legislation.

Article 16

The separation of basic organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment from a work organization, the entry of a work organization manufacturing armament and military equipment into a complex organization of associated labor and other forms of pooling labor and capital, the adoption of decisions on other changes in status of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment, and a change in the line of business of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be subject to the prior consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 17

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall not grant the consent referred to in Article 16 of this law if the separation, entry into association or other status changes referred to in Article 16 of this does not ensure efficient and reliable manufacture of armament and military equipment, the engineering and technological integrity of the facility and the economic and legal independence of the organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

At the latest within 60 days from the date of receipt of the request the Federal Secretariat for National Defense is required to grant or refuse the consent referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article and the consent for change in the line of business of an organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

If within the period stated in Paragraph 2 of this article the Federal Secretariat for National Defense takes no position on the request submitted, the consent requested shall be considered granted.

If the Federal Secretariat for National Defense refuses consent, the Federal Executive Council shall decide the matter at issue on the petition of the organization of associated labor.

Article 18

General self-management acts of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and their acts of establishment or organization and certificates of entry in the court register of such organizations of associated labor may not contain information on the nature of the business activity if such information constitutes a national defense secret.

If the interests of the country's defense and security so require, the trade name or corporate name of the organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment may not contain an indication of the activity performed by that organization of associated labor.

Article 19

The federal secretary for national defense shall state in which basic organizations of associated labor, work organizations and complex organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment the executive officers or chairman and members of executive committees for the professional management of such organizations shall be appointed and dismissed under the provision of Article 378 of the Law on Associated Labor with the consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

III. Manufacturing Facilities and Manufacturing of Armament and Military Equipment

1. Facilities for Manufacturing Armament and Military Equipment

Article 20

For the purpose of this law "facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment" means a system of functionally related elements organized as complete entities with respect to production technology (production equipment, infrastructure, structures, documentation, special tools and other operating assets) and personnel.

Article 21

Facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment covered by the provision of Article 20 of this law consist of the following:

1) entire facilities of basic organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment;

2) certain facilities or parts of such facilities used for the manufacture of armament and military equipment of other basic organizations of associated labor which have concluded a long-term contract on the manufacture of armament and military equipment or on maintenance of such facilities in a permanent state of readiness for manufacturing with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense or with organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment;

3) certain facilities of basic organizations of associated labor which on the basis of federal law have been designated for wartime manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Article 22

The construction, modernization, reconstruction, maintenance and use of the facilities referred to in Article 21 of this law shall be based on medium-term and annual programs for construction, modernization, reconstruction and maintenance and use of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment (hereafter referred to as "construction program").

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment within the framework of the community of the Yugoslav armament and military equipment industry shall collaborate with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense in drafting the construction program.

The construction program shall be adopted by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense on the basis of the plans for development, construction and equipment of the SFRY Armed Forces and other national defense needs, in conformity with plans for national defense.

Article 23

The construction program shall set forth the orientation of the production program, the size of capacity and the engineering and technological level of the facilities covered by Article 21 of this law in accordance with the purposes and tasks of those facilities in the manufacture of armament and military equipment, with the organization of the production process and with the engineering and technological capability.

In setting forth the size of capacity and engineering and technological level of the facility, as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article, within

the limits of the orientation established for the production program, the construction program shall also set forth the special conditions for particular facilities, specifically: the engineering and technological capability of the facility, recruitment of personnel for the production planned, special workplace safety measures and the security measures of the facility.

Article 24

The size of capacity, orientation of the production program and engineering and technological level of the facilities covered by Article 21 of this law shall be established on the basis of the following:

1) the plan for developing, building and equipping the SFRY Armed Forces;

2) the plan for allocation of funds necessary for the training of young people and the population at large for defense of the country and to meet the country's other defense needs;

3) the international obligations of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed on the basis of decisions of federal authorities;

4) the country's material and other capabilities for developing and achieving domestic manufacture of armament and military equipment;

5) special conditions of wartime manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

By the orientation of the production program is meant the subject of long-term development work and manufacturing in the field of one or several armament and military equipment groups related in purpose, design and manufacturing technology.

Article 25

In fixing the size of capacity and the engineering and technological level of a particular facility covered by Article 21 of this law the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall collaborate with the organizations of associated labor whose facility is involved or in whose facility funds for new construction, modernization, reconstruction or maintenance of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment are to be invested.

The contract between the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the organizations of associated labor referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall regulate in detail mutual rights and obligations related to construction of new facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment or to modernization, reconstruction and maintenance of existing facilities and also with respect to the conditions and procedure governing the use of those facilities for the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 26

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment is required to maintain facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment in a condition fit for such production at all times, under the conditions and in the manner set forth in this law.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall monitor the maintenance of the assigned size of capacity and engineering and technological level of the facilities covered by Paragraph 1 of this article.

Specific records shall be kept on particular elements of the facilities covered by Paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 27

On the recommendation of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense the Federal Executive Council shall discontinue facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment or parts of such facilities of basic organizations of associated labor.

By discontinuation of facilities or parts of facilities as covered by Paragraph 1 of this article is meant a change of purpose and tasks of facilities covered by Article 21, Subparagraph 1, of this law or parts of them whose consequence is the termination of the production of articles constituting armament and military equipment and the reorientation to another activity of the entire capacity or that part of the capacity of the basic organization of associated labor which was intended for the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

On the basis of the decision referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the organization of associated labor whose facility or part of whose facility has been discontinued shall draft a program of measures to arrange the discharge of obligations created, the disposition of fixed capital, the employment of personnel and resolution of the economic and other consequences of the facility's discontinuation.

Funds to carry out the program of measures referred to in Paragraph 3 of this article shall be furnished out of funds allocated in the federal budget to finance national defense and out of other funds.

The decision to discontinue a facility referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be taken no later than 3 years before the date envisaged for discontinuation of the facility.

Article 28

The construction, modernization, reconstruction and maintenance of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be based on

investment programs drafted in conformity with the construction program, the provisions of this law and regulations enacted on the basis of this law. The organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall prepare and draft the investment program in collaboration with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The investment program referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be adopted by the body of self-management of the organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

The investment program referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be subject to consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall grant or refuse that consent within 60 days from the date of submittal of the investment program.

Article 29

The investment program referred to in Article 28 of this law shall specifically contain the following:

1) the principal data from the construction program;

2) technical documentation of the project;

3) data on the production of armament and military equipment and a statement of the conception of the manufacturing technology and the envisaged operating scheme;

4) the possibility of manufacturing the armament and military equipment which is the subject of the investment program on the basis of industrial cooperation with relevant organizations of associated labor;

5) the economic status of the organization of associated labor at the time when the investment program is submitted, along with production results for the last 3 years;

6) the condition of existing capacities, including data on their purpose, breadth and degree of use and technological capability;

7) conformity of the investment program with the land-use plan and urban plan, the fuel and power situation and the water management situation of the immediate area in which the facility is located or in which it is to be built;

8) data on the space required for operation, on the infrastructure and on the equipment necessary for the manufacture of armament and military equipment;

9) data on recruitment of personnel necessary for the planned production of armament and military equipment;

10) data on sources of financing for construction of new facilities or for modernization, reconstruction or maintenance of existing facilities, including evidence that funds have been secured;

11) analysis of prices of armament and military equipment to be produced and a comparative survey of such prices relative to present prices of the same or similar armament and military equipment in Yugoslavia and abroad.

Article 30

Funds to finance the investment program for new construction, modernization, reconstruction or maintenance of facilities for manufacture of armament and military equipment shall be furnished by the organization of associated labor and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 31

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall furnish funds to finance the investment program under Article 28 of this law from its own resources, from bank credit, and from other sources.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall furnish funds to finance the investment program under Article 28 of this law out of funds allocated in the federal budget to finance national defense and from other sources.

Article 32

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall plan and allocate funds to finance investment programs under Article 28 of this law in accordance with the construction program.

The funds furnished by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense to finance investment programs under Article 28 of this law shall be given to organizations of associated labor in the form of credit.

Article 33

As an exception to the provision of Article 32, Paragraph 2, of this law the Secretariat for National Defense may make grants to organizations of associated labor which are not to be returned for new construction, modernization, reconstruction or maintenance of facilities for the manufacture of armament and military equipment which are used as reserve facilities for the country's wartime needs.

The funds referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall be indicated in the year-end statement of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense in the manner defined by the law regulating the funds and financing of the Yugoslav People's Army.

2. Manufacture of Armament and Military Equipment

Article 34

Development of new armament and military equipment and the manufacture of armament and military equipment already adopted are a part of the unified process whereby the SFRY Armed Forces are equipped with armament and military equipment and other national defense needs are met.

The development of new armament and military equipment and the manufacture of armament and military equipment already adopted shall be based on a program for development and manufacture of armament and military equipment (hereafter referred to as the "production program") adopted by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 35

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment, in accordance with the orientation of their production program assigned them, shall as a rule be responsible for developing armament and military equipment.

Designated institutions of the Yugoslav People's Army shall also be responsible for developing armament and military equipment.

Other manufacturing or scientific research organizations of associated labor in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may also be responsible for developing armament and military equipment if necessary.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall designate those responsible for developing a particular weapon or particular piece of military equipment in conformity with the provisions of Paragraphs 1 through 3 of this article.

Article 36

Those responsible for developing armament and military equipment and other participants in development of armament and military equipment must abide by the special conditions, procedures and measures set forth by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The developer of armament and military equipment designated under the provisions of Article 35, Paragraph 4, of this law shall organize and coordinate the work of developing armament and military equipment among participants in development of armament and military equipment.

Mutual rights and obligations related to development of armament and military equipment shall be regulated by a specific contract concerning development of a particular piece of equipment between the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the developer of that piece of equipment.

Article 37

The provisions of this law and of regulations enacted on the basis of this law shall be appropriately applied to the manufacture of finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, reproduction materials, raw materials, etc., which under the provisions of Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law are of particular importance to the wartime manufacture and maintenance of armament and military equipment.

Article 38

Organizations of associated labor which to meet the needs of manufacturing armament and military equipment produce finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, reproduction materials, raw materials, etc., which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment, and also organizations of associated labor rendering services to meet the needs of manufacturing armament and military equipment (hereafter referred to as "organizations engaged in the manufacturing and rendering of services covered by Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law") must in the manufacture of armament and military equipment adhere to the special conditions envisaged by regulations or as set forth in the contract concerning the quality and reliability of armament and military equipment.

Article 39

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall organize their own quality and reliability control to control the quality and reliability of armament and military equipment in the manufacturing process and before delivery.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall also control the quality and reliability of armament and military equipment as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article through its service for control of the quality and reliability of armament and military equipment.

The federal secretary for national defense or officer whom he authorizes may send persons serving in the Yugoslav People's Army to organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment or to organizations engaged in the manufacturing and rendering of services referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law in order to control quality and reliability of armament and military equipment.

In the case described in Paragraph 3 of this article the organization of associated labor must furnish the conditions necessary for performance of that control, except for specialized equipment furnished by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 40

Military personnel on active duty in the Yugoslav People's Army may be assigned or posted to organizations of associated labor as referred to in Article 7 of this law to perform specific tasks and jobs.

The federal secretary for national defense may issue a list of jobs and salary positions in organizations of associated labor as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article which must be filled by military personnel on active duty.

An organization of associated labor as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article may propose to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense that it assign or post active military personnel to particular positions even when such positions are not on the list of jobs referred to in Paragraph 2 of this article.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the organization of associated labor referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall regulate in an agreement their mutual rights and obligations toward the person assigned or posted to a position in an organization of associated labor.

Article 41

The contract between the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment or organizations engaged in manufacturing and rendering services as referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law, and the contract between such organizations shall regulate mutual rights and obligations related to that manufacturing or the rendering of such services.

If the contracting parties referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article do not reach agreement, the matters in dispute shall be resolved by a special arbitration commission consisting of three members. Each of the parties shall name one member of the arbitration commission, and the third member shall be named by the Federal Executive Council. The decision of the arbitration commission shall be enforceable and shall be applied until agreement is reached.

In case of a dispute as referred to in Paragraph 2 of this article, the organizations of associated labor referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article must carry on manufacturing or render services under the conditions governing the manufacturing or rendering of services before the dispute occurred until such time as the arbitration commission renders its decision.

Article 42

The social compact which the Federal Executive Council and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment conclude within the framework of the Community of the Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Industry shall regulate the following: the bases for bringing the orientation of the production program, the size of capacity and the engineering and technological level of facilities for production of armament and military equipment into conformity with national defense plans and needs; the bases and criteria for establishing the reproductive capacity [ability to set aside depreciation and funds for investment--translator's note] of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment; the bases and criteria for arrangement of relations in planning and programming facilities for the manufacture of armament and military equipment; the bases and criteria for joint investment undertakings in facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment, and other matters of particular public interest related to such facilities or of broader common interest to participants in the social compact.

IV. Planning in the Field of the Manufacturing of Armament and Military Equipment

Article 43

In order to strengthen the combat readiness of the SFRY Armed Forces and the defense capability and preparedness of all participants in the system of nationwide defense, and bearing in mind the significance and role of manufacturing armament and military equipment in the overall socioeconomic and sociopolitical development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in preserving the achievements of the revolution and the independence and freedom of the nationalities and ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia, the social plan of Yugoslavia shall ensure the development and equipping of the SFRY Armed Forces and the achievement of other common interests and goals in the domain of the country's national defense and security.

Article 44

That portion of the Yugoslav social plan which pertains to the field of the manufacturing of armament and military equipment shall be based on an agreement concerning the basic elements of the Yugoslav social plan in the field of the manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

The agreement referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be deemed concluded when it has been accepted by the Federal Executive Council, the executive councils of the assemblies of the republics, the executive councils of the assemblies of the autonomous provinces, and the bodies of self-management of the organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and when it has been confirmed by the SFRY Assembly, the assemblies of the republics and the assemblies of the autonomous provinces.

Article 45

The agreement referred to in Article 44 of this law shall be concluded in conformity with the plans for the country's defense, plans for developing, building and equipping the SFRY Armed Forces, and wartime plans for manufacturing armament and military equipment.

Article 46

The agreement referred to in Article 44 of this law shall specifically set forth the goals of new construction, modernization, reconstruction or maintenance of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment, obligations and rights of sociopolitical communities and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment in connection with developing, building and modernizing the SFRY Armed Forces and supplying them with up-to-date weapons and pieces of military equipment, the overall development of scientific research and relations between that research and the national scientific potential, covering as well the involvement of other organizations of associated labor and other domestic resources in the manufacturing of armament and military equipment. That agreement shall state that the manufacturing of armament and military equipment has the status of those activities proclaimed by the Yugoslav social plan to be activities of particular importance to implementing the agreed policy for overall development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Article 47

The provisions of the Law on the Bases of the System of Social Planning and on the Yugoslav Social Plan shall apply to conclusion of the agreement on the basic elements of the Yugoslav social plan in the field of the manufacturing of armament and military equipment unless this law provides otherwise.

Article 48

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and organizations engaged in the manufacturing and rendering of services referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law shall conclude a self-management accord concerning the bases of the joint plan for manufacturing armament and military equipment, taking into account the importance of the domestic production of armament and military equipment to achieving the conception of nationwide defense, the need for unity in the process of manufacturing armament and military equipment, and also mutual dependency, relationship and responsibility.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the competent bodies of the republics and autonomous provinces shall participate in concluding the self-management accord referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall adopt a joint plan for manufacturing armament and military equipment on the basis of the self-management accord referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

If the self-management accord referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article is not concluded within 6 months from the date when the initiative was taken to conclude it, or if a self-management accord already concluded ceases to be valid, the Federal Executive Council shall institute proceedings for conclusion of a self-management accord and shall issue a regulation setting forth the temporary bases of the joint production plan.

Regulations issued on the basis of Paragraph 4 of this article shall be applied until a self-management accord is concluded in accordance with the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article, but no longer than 1 year from the date when they take effect.

Article 49

The self-management accord and joint plan referred to in Article 48 of this law shall be concluded or adopted in conformity with the agreement referred to in Article 44 of this law and the plans referred to in Article 45 of this law.

The joint plan for manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be adopted for a period of 5 years.

Article 50

Workers in organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment have the right and duty, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on the Bases of the System of Social Planning and on the Yugoslav Social Plan, and also in conformity with the agreement referred to in Article 44 of this law, the self-management accord referred to in Article 48 of this law, and the plans referred to in Articles 45 and 48 of this law, to independently adopt and carry out the plans of their organizations of associated labor in relations of mutual cooperation, dependency and relationship in the process of the manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Article 51

Organizations of associated labor as referred to in Article 48 of this law shall adopt their plans on the basis of a self-management accord on the bases of the plan concluded with interested organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities.

Article 52

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall adopt a medium-term plan covering a 5-year period, and in order to implement that medium-term plan they shall adopt annual plans in which they set forth the tasks for the respective years and guidelines for appropriate measures to be taken in the respective year to implement the medium-term plan.

The annual plan shall specifically set forth tasks related to development of particular weapons and pieces of military equipment and types, quantities and rates of production or deliveries of particular weapons and pieces of military equipment in the year for which the plan is adopted.

Article 53

For the sake of timely preparation and adoption of the plan of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense must furnish those organizations of associated labor data on the needs for armament and military equipment for the next 5-year period no later than 1 year before expiration of the last year of the current joint plan for manufacturing of armament and military equipment or the medium-term plan of those organizations of associated labor, and for the sake of preparation and adoption of the annual plan they shall do so at least 3 months before commencement of the year for which the annual plan is being adopted.

Article 54

If the interests of national defense so require, and if for that reason it is necessary to amend or adopt new tasks, deadlines and priorities in the manufacturing of armament and military equipment, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense is required to institute proceedings to amend and supplement the self-management accord that has been concluded on the bases of the joint plan for manufacturing of armament and military equipment or the joint plan for manufacturing of armament and military equipment that has been adopted. In case of an immediate danger of war or other exceptional circumstances, if urgent needs of national defense so require, the Federal Executive Council, as an exception to the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article, may amend the established bases of the joint plan for manufacturing or the joint plan adopted for manufacturing of armament and military equipment and define new tasks, set new deadlines and fix new priorities in the manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Article 55

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall assign wartime programs for manufacturing of armament and military equipment and wartime tasks to the organizations of associated labor referred to in Article 7 of this law

in conformity with the country's defense plans, plans for developing, building and equipping the SFRY Armed Forces and other needs of national defense, and wartime plans for manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Article 56

The provisions of the Law on the Bases of the System of Social Planning and on the Yugoslav Social Plan shall be appropriately applied to the conclusion of the agreement on the bases of the joint plan for manufacturing of armament and military equipment and adoption of that plan and to the planning of organizations of associated labor covered by Article 48 of this law.

V. Trade in Armament and Military Equipment in Yugoslavia

Article 57

Trade in armament and military equipment in Yugoslavia shall be restricted and shall be conducted under the conditions and in the manner defined by this law.

Article 58

By trade in armament and military equipment in Yugoslavia are meant transactions for the purchase and sale of armament and military equipment, the rendering of trade-related services and other transactions related to the armament and military equipment trade.

Article 59

Armament and military equipment may be put on sale in Yugoslavia only if they have been manufactured in accordance with the prescribed technical specifications and other prescribed conditions.

Article 60

The trade in armament and military equipment in Yugoslavia shall be conducted under the conditions set forth in this law by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment.

Organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities, private individuals and civil juridical persons and foreign juridical and natural persons may not carry on trade in armament and military equipment in Yugoslavia, except for the agencies and organizations referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

Purchases of armament and military equipment from organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be made to meet the needs of equipping the SFRY Armed Forces by the Federal Secretariat

for National Defense directly or through authorized units or institutions of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Article 61

Territorial defense staffs and competent agencies of sociopolitical communities, as well as organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities may purchase armament and military equipment from organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment in order to equip their territorial defense units, to meet civil defense needs or for other needs of national defense and social self-protection under the conditions and in the manner defined by a regulation adopted on the basis of this law.

VI. Management, Use and Disposition of Socially Owned Assets Intended for Manufacture of Armament and Military Equipment

Article 62

Special rights, obligations and responsibilities of workers in organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment with respect to the use, management and disposition of socially owned assets intended for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment shall be exercised and discharged in accordance with the nature and purpose of those assets and the needs of realizing the particular public interest in the field of manufacturing armament and military equipment, in the manner and under the conditions set forth in this law.

Article 63

The socially owned assets referred to in Article 62 of this law consist of assets intended for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment or which are so used in basic organizations of associated labor, assets provided for that purpose by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, and assets secured for that purpose from other sources.

Article 64

Workers in basic and other organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall obtain socially owned assets for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment from the net income or income which they earn from the gross income realized on the bases enumerated in the Law on Associated Labor, and in the distribution of income they shall ensure stable and reliable production of armament and military equipment and the necessary personnel capability of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment.

The social compacts concluded by the Federal Executive Council and organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment

within the framework of the Community of the Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Industry shall ensure achievement of the goals stated in Paragraph 1 of this article and shall regulate relations in the earning and distribution of joint revenue and joint income realized by the pooling of labor and capital in the context of Paragraph 1 of this article.

If within 6 months from the date initiative is taken to conclude the social compact referred to in Paragraph 2 of this article, a social compact is not concluded, or if a social compact which has been concluded ceases to be valid, the Federal Executive Council shall take the initiative for conclusion of a social compact and may issue a regulation that will temporarily regulate the matters and relations set forth in Paragraph 2 of this article.

Regulations adopted on the basis of Paragraph 3 of this article shall be applied until the social compact is concluded pursuant to the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article, but no longer than 1 year from the date they take effect.

Article 65

For the purpose of this law it shall specifically be regarded that an organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment is not ensuring realization of the particular public interest in the following cases:

1) if for a lengthy period it does not renew socially owned assets intended for manufacturing of armament and military equipment or does not increase their value in conformity with the provisions of this law;

2) if it uses, manages or disposes of socially owned assets intended for manufacturing of armament and military equipment contrary to the provisions of this law;

3) if frequently or for a lengthy period it does not discharge contractual obligations with respect to the production or delivery of armament or military equipment or if frequently or for a lengthy period it does not meet conditions with respect to the quality and reliability of those products prescribed or specified in the contract.

If it finds that an organization of associated labor is failing to meet any of the conditions enumerated in Paragraph 1 of this article, the Federal Executive Council may decide that that organization of associated labor shall not manufacture armament and military equipment.

Article 66

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment may not convey or deliver for temporary use means of production and other productive assets intended for the manufacturing of armament and

military equipment to another organization of associated labor or other public juridical person with or without compensation, nor may it alienate them from social ownership, nor may it alter the existing engineering and technological integrity of facilities without consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

If within 60 days from the date a request is submitted the Federal Secretariat for National Defense does not grant the consent referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article, the organization of associated labor is entitled to compensation of actual damages resulting from the refusal to grant consent.

The amount of the actual damages shall be fixed by agreement between organizations of associated labor and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. If agreement is not reached, the amount of the actual damages shall be settled by the competent court or the Military Economic Arbitration Committee of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense in conformity with Article 89 of this law.

Funds to pay actual damages as referred to in Paragraph 3 of this article shall be furnished out of the funds envisaged for financing national defense unless specific funds have been furnished in the federal budget for that purpose.

Article 67

In case of determination of an organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment or cessation of the manufacturing of armament and military equipment in such organization of associated labor, that organization is required to offer the means of production and other productive assets intended for manufacturing of armament and military equipment to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The organization of associated labor referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article must in its offer state the amount of the book value of the assets the terms of payment for the value of the assets and other conditions for taking over the assets.

Within 60 days from the date the offer is received the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall declare whether it accepts the assets under the conditions offered.

If the Federal Secretariat for National Defense decides to accept the assets referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article, it must compensate the organization of associated labor for the value of the assets taken over.

Article 68

Computation of depreciation and adjustment of the value of fixed capital comprising facilities for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the federal law

regulating depreciation of fixed capital of basic organizations of associated labor and other users of socially owned assets.

The amount of depreciation computed under Paragraph 1 of this article shall be set aside and kept in a separate account of the basic organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment with the Social Accounting Service and shall be used for replacement, modernization and purchase of capital assets, with the prior consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The Federal Executive Council shall prescribe the dates and manner for setting aside depreciation for fixed assets comprising facilities for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment and the procedure which shall be applied in this connection.

Article 69

If a basic organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment is not using certain means of production or other productive assets intended for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense may order in conformity with the construction program that such assets be transferred to another organization of associated labor or given to another organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment for temporary use.

In the case referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article the basic organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment whose assets are transferred to another organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be entitled to compensation in the amount of that portion of the value of those assets which has not been amortized.

The compensation referred to in Paragraph 2 of this article, when assets are transferred to another organization of associated labor, shall be guaranteed and paid to the basic organization of associated labor whose assets are transferred by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. Relations between the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and that organization in connection with the transfer of assets shall be regulated in detail in the contract.

In the case referred to in Paragraph 3 of this article the organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment to which the assets have been transferred must pay the Federal Secretariat for National Defense the amount of compensation which the Secretariat has paid the organization of associated labor whose assets were transferred. Relations between the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and that organization in connection with the transfer of assets and the payment of compensation shall be regulated in detail in the contract.

If the assets referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article are given to another organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment for temporary use, compensation for that temporary use shall be guaranteed and paid by the basic organization of associated labor to which the assets have been given for temporary use. Relations between the interested organizations of associated labor in connection with temporary use of the assets and payment of the compensation shall be regulated in detail in a contract.

Article 70

The provisions of Articles 66, 67 and 69 of this law shall also apply to the following:

1) capital assets of organizations of associated labor under Article 7, Subparagraph 2, of this law;

2) capital invested in organizations of associated labor which are being prepared for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment and capital assets of those organizations intended for wartime manufacturing of armament and military equipment;

3) capital assets of organizations of associated labor purchased or built with funds furnished in the allocation for national defense in the federal budget for the production of finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, reproduction materials, raw materials and other products which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment;

4) capital assets of organizations of associated labor manufacturing equipment for capital investment projects, reproduction materials, raw materials or other assets which are of particular importance to national defense.

The provision of Subparagraph 4, Paragraph 1, of this article shall apply to capital assets of organizations of associated labor referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law as designated by the Federal Executive Council on the recommendation of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Article 71

Funds for improvement and expansion of the material bases of operation in basic organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be used for the modernization and improvement of the means of production or other productive assets, for the construction, modernization, reconstruction and maintenance of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment, for research and development, and for investment in permanent working capital in the field of manufacturing armament and military equipment and for other needs that have a bearing on the manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

As an exception to the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article, funds to improve and expand the material bases of operation may also be pooled for other purposes in accordance with the construction program and the program for manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Article 72

Basic organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall create, renew, use, pool and manage reserve funds according to the provisions of a separate federal law.

Article 73

Material reserves which are purchased and held by the organizations of associated labor referred to in Article 7 of this law for exceptional needs of national defense, and also assets, structures and equipment of those organizations held as reserve facilities for the wartime needs of national defense, shall not be subject to taxes and other levies.

For the purpose of this law "taxes and other levies" means taxes, customs duties, administrative fees, contributions, compulsory loans and other similar payments envisaged by federal, republic, provincial or opstina legislation.

The federal secretary for national defense shall define what is meant in Paragraph 1 of this article by material reserves, assets, structures and equipment.

Article 74

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment may use working capital earmarked for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment solely to meet the needs of their production.

Article 75

Means of production and other productive assets of an organization of associated labor for manufacturing armament and military equipment, finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, reproduction materials, raw materials and other products which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment and manufactured armament and military equipment of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment may not be subject to execution proceedings.

Article 76

The self-management accord on the pooling of labor and capital or other general self-management acts may not envisage the liability of an organiation

of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment for the obligations of another organization of associated labor which do not arise out of business related to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment.

Provisions of a self-management accord which are contrary to the provision of Paragraph 1 of this article are null and void.

VII. Security and Social Self-Protection in the Field of the Manufacturing and Sale of Armament and Military Equipment in Yugoslavia

Article 77

Security and social self-protection in the field of the manufacturing and sale of armament and military equipment shall encompass the following: measures and procedures for the security and protection of facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment and structures for storage and safekeeping of armament and military equipment; security measures during transport of armament and military equipment; safekeeping and protection of secret data concerning production facilities and structures for storage and safekeeping of armament and military equipment and data concerning the manufacture and sale of armament and military equipment; special measures to protect secret data in this field in relations with foreign countries and special workplace safety measures.

Article 78

Security and social self-protection in the manufacture and sale of armament and military equipment shall be based on the basic principles of national defense security set forth in federal law, and shall be organized and implemented in conformity with the provisions of this law and regulations enacted on the basis of this law and other federal legislation on the protection and safekeeping of secret national defense data.

Article 79

The tasks of security and social self-protection enumerated in Article 77 of this law shall be performed within the limits of the rights and duties established by law and in conformity with the provisions of this law and regulations issued on the basis of this law by the workers employed in agencies of sociopolitical communities, organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities, by authorized agencies of sociopolitical communities, by security agencies of the Yugoslav People's Army, and by organizations of associated labor and organizations engaged in the manufacture and sale, transport, or storage of armament and military equipment or which possess armament and military equipment on some other basis.

Article 80

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment is required to organize the implementation of measures of security and social self-protection in conformity with the provisions of this law and to create a special security service and security units.

The organization, composition, strength, type of weapons and other material and technical facilities of the security service and security units shall be set forth in a decision of the body of self-management of organizations of associated labor.

Article 81

Workers belonging to the security service and security units referred to in Article 80, Paragraph 1, of this law, when guarding a facility for manufacturing armament and military equipment, structures for storage and safekeeping of such weapons and equipment, and other structures of an organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall abide by regulations on protection and guarding of such structures and regulations on social self-protection which regulate the rights, duties and procedures of workers belonging to the security service in organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities.

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall adopt plans for technical and physical security and protection against fire of production facilities and structures for storage and safekeeping of armament and military equipment and other plans for implementing the measures of security and social self-protection, and also detailed instruction for carrying out the measures of security and social self-protection.

The provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall also apply to other organizations and agencies of sociopolitical communities which on any basis whatsoever are holding and keeping armament and military equipment in their structures.

Article 82

The tasks of security, in accordance with the federal law regulating the bases of the state security system, in organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be performed by security agencies of the Yugoslav People's Army in accordance with the provisions of the law regulating national defense, this law and regulations enacted on the basis of those laws.

The security agencies of the Yugoslav People's Army, in addition to the measures they take as authorized security agencies in the context of federal law, shall within their competence furnish technical aid to organizations of

associated labor in preparing and enacting the instructions referred to in Article 81 of this law and shall participate in adoption of measures for security and social protection and evaluation of the secrecy of data, documents, weapons and pieces of military equipment, structures of particular interest to national defense, and particular jobs and positions and tasks of particular importance to the SFRY Armed Forces.

In performing tasks within their competency security agencies of the Yugoslav People's Army in organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall collaborate with the security service and law enforcement agencies, the bodies of self-management and other bodies of organizations of associated labor and agencies of the sociopolitical community.

The security agencies referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be responsible for their work to the authorized officer of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense in accordance with regulations on the work of security agencies in the Yugoslav People's Army.

Article 83

Data on facilities for manufacturing armament and military equipment, concerning programs and plans for development or production of armament and military equipment and concerning their fulfillment, concerning the import and export of armament and military equipment, concerning scientific-technical and other cooperation with foreign countries in the field of armament and military equipment, and other data related to the manufacturing and sale of armament and military equipment shall be regarded as secret national defense data.

The federal secretary for national defense shall prescribe which data related to the production and sale of armament and military equipment shall not be considered secret national defense data and shall define the conditions and manner whereby certain secret data referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article may be divulged to interested persons in business and official relations or made public.

Article 84

Weapons, guns, ammunition, explosives and other armament and military equipment which are hazardous articles may not be transported by public carriers unless accompanied by an escort who is armed.

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment or shipping weapons and pieces of military equipment shall be responsible for the guarding of such weapons and equipment until they are turned over to the customer or user.

The federal secretary for national defense shall issue regulations concerning the security measures and manner of guarding the shipment of armament and military equipment.

Article 85

On the grounds of structures for development and manufacturing of armament and military equipment and structures for storage and safekeeping of armament and military equipment organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment may not erect structures without consent of the federal secretary for national defense or military officer whom he authorizes.

On the grounds of structures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article the performance of other activities may also be restricted or prohibited, and settlement and movement may be restricted or prohibited if there is a danger of a threat to the security of those structures or to the safety of the public.

The grounds of structures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall be defined by the federal secretary for national defense or military officer whom he authorizes.

Article 86

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment or participating in the manufacture of armament and military equipment, other organizations of associated labor and organizations and agencies of sociopolitical communities which purchase and hold for their own needs, which are guarding or which on some other basis are in possession of armament and military equipment must keep special records concerning them in the manner prescribed by the federal secretary for national defense.

The bodies within the organization of associated labor and the agencies referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article must report any disappearance of armament and military equipment or their parts immediately, no later than within 24 hours, to the body for workers' self-management control and the military security agency or law enforcement agency.

VIII. Provisions Concerning Inspection and Settlement of Disputes

Article 87

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall conduct inspections within organizations of associated labor as referred to in Article 7 of this law in order to see that provisions of this law are being applied and enforced.

Article 88

In conducting inspections as referred to in Article 87 of this law the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall collaborate with bodies of self-management and other bodies of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment, and after completion of inspection they shall give notice of irregularities discovered so that they may be corrected.

An official record shall be kept of the condition ascertained in the conduct of an inspection as referred to in Article 87 of this law.

Article 89

Economic disputes and other disputes in substantive law arising out of the mutual relations of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and disputes between those organizations of associated labor and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense may be submitted for settlement to the Military Economic Arbitration Committee of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, which has been established by federal law as a permanent elected tribunal.

IX. Provisions Concerning the Powers of Federal Bodies, Agencies and Officials

Article 90

The Federal Executive Council is hereby authorized:

1) to designate the products and services referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment;

2) to issue regulations concerning procedure related to the transfer or appropriation of means of production and other productive assets referred to in Article 66, Paragraph 1, of this law.

Article 91

The federal secretary for national defense is authorized to issue regulations on the following:

1) on the documentation to be appended to a proposal for establishment of a work organization for manufacturing armament and military equipment and regulations on procedure for issuance of consent to establishment of such organizations;

2) on the articles which shall be regarded as armament and military equipment for the purpose of this law;

3) on the elements of records on facilities for manufacture of armament and military equipment and the manner of keeping such records;

4) on the conditions under which capital furnished under Article 31 of this law by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall be invested;

5) on the content of investment programs and the manner of their submittal;

6) on the manner of supervising the use of funds to carry out investment programs;

7) on procedure and measures which those responsible for development of weapons and pieces of military equipment and other participants in such work must adhere to;

8) on the conditions and manner of controlling quality and reliability of armament and military equipment;

9) on the conditions and manner of purchase of weapons and pieces of military equipment to meet the needs of the Yugoslav People's Army, territorial defense and other national defense needs;

10) on the assets which are regarded as capital assets for the manufacturing of armament and military equipment for the purpose of this law;

11) on the manner of keeping records of capital assets for manufacturing armament and military equipment and the manner in which their safekeeping and maintenance shall be supervised;

12) on technical documentation and other conditions which armament and military equipment must meet to be put on sale in Yugoslavia;

13) on special measures and procedure for workplace safety in the production of armament and military equipment;

14) on the measures, conditions and procedure for protection of secret data in the domain of armament and military equipment in relations with foreign countries.

X. Punitive Provisions

1. Economic Violations

Article 92

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be subject to a fine of not less than 100,000 and not more than 1 million dinars for an economic violation in the following cases:

1) if it establishes a work organization for manufacturing armament and military equipment without the prior consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 8);

2) if it enters into association with a basic organization of associated labor which does not manufacture armament and military equipment (Article 10, Paragraph 2) or with a work organization which does not manufacture armament and military equipment or enters into other forms of the pooling of labor and capital (Article 11)--contrary to the conditions stated in Article 10, Paragraph 1, of this law;

3) if it changes its line of business without consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 16);

4) if in the development of armament or military equipment it does not adhere to the prescribed special conditions, procedures or measures (Article 36, Paragraph 1);

5) if in the manufacture of armament and military equipment it does not abide by special conditions relating to the quality and reliability of armament and military equipment envisaged by regulations or specified in a contract (Article 38);

6) if until a decision is rendered by an arbitration commission as referred to in Article 41, Paragraph 2, of this law it does not manufacture armament and military equipment under the conditions which were in effect before the dispute arose (Article 41, Paragraph 3);

7) if it does not adopt a joint production plan (Article 48, Paragraph 3) or does not adopt the production plans referred to in Article 52 of this law;

8) if it does not place amounts of depreciation computed on capital assets which represent facilities for the manufacturing of weapons and pieces of military equipment in a separate account or if it uses the amounts separately contrary to this law (Article 68, Paragraph 2);

9) if in a self-management accord on the pooling of labor and capital or other general self-management act it assumes liability for the obligations of another organization of associated labor which do not arise out of business related to the manufacture of armament and military equipment (Article 76, Paragraph 1).

An organization of associated labor shall also be subject to an economic violation as stated in Subparagraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Paragraph 1 of this article if it produces to meet the needs of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment finished products, assemblies, reproduction materials or other articles or renders them services which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment as referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law.

The person responsible in the organization of associated labor shall also be fined no less than 2,000 and no more than 30,000 dinars for the actions enumerated in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article for an economic violation.

2. Misdemeanors

Article 93

An organization of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall be subject to a fine of no less than 5,000 and no more than 100,000 dinars for a misdemeanor in the following cases:

1) if it separates from an organization of associated labor, enters into association with another organization or effects another change in status without the prior consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 16);

2) if it appoints or dismisses an executive officer or the chairman and members of executive committees for professional management without consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 19);

3) if it does not use facilities for the manufacture of armament and military equipment or does not maintain them in conformity with the provisions of this law, with regulations enacted on the basis of law or with conditions stipulated in a contract with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, or if it does not keep the prescribed records concerning such facilities (Article 25, Paragraph 2, and Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 3, in connection with Article 91, Subparagraph 2);

4) if it undertakes to carry out an investment program before having obtained consent (Article 28, Paragraph 3);

5) if it conveys the means of production and other productive assets intended for the manufacture of armament or military equipment with or without compensation or gives them for temporary use to another organization of associated labor or other public juridical person or alienates such assets from social ownership without consent of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 66);

6) if in case of discontinuation or cessation of the manufacture of armament and military equipment it does not offer means of production and other productive assets intended for the manufacture of armament and military equipment to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Article 67, Paragraph 1);

7) if it does not use funds for improvement and expansion of the material bases of operation for the purposes set forth in this law (Article 71, Paragraph 1) or if it uses working capital earmarked for the manufacture of armament and military equipment for other purposes (Article 74);

8) if it does not organize and accomplish security and social self-protection in conformity with the provision of this law and regulations enacted on the basis of law (Article 78) or does not create a security service or security units (Article 80, Paragraph 1) or if it does not adopt more detailed instructions and plans for technical and physical security or fire protection of its facilities and structures for storage and safekeeping of armament and military equipment, and if it does not adopt other necessary regulations and plans concerning enforcement of the measures of security and social self-protection (Article 81, Paragraph 2);

9) if it divulges or makes public data as referred to in Article 83, Paragraph 1, of this law contrary to the regulations referred to in Article 83, Paragraph 2, of this law;

10) if it ships weapons and pieces of military equipment which represent hazardous articles to a customer or user contrary to the provisions of this law or regulations on security of the shipment of armament and military equipment (Article 84);

11) if it does not keep the prescribed records on armament and military equipment which it manufactures, purchases, holds, keeps, or possesses on some other basis or if it does not report the disappearance of armament and military equipment or parts of them to the competent authority within the prescribed period (Article 86).

An organization of associated labor which manufactures assemblies, reproduction materials or other articles or renders services which are of particular importance to the manufacturing of armament and military equipment as stated in Article 2, Paragraph 2, of this law shall also be subject to the penalty for misdemeanors enumerated in Subparagraphs 2, 5, 6 and 8 of Paragraph 1 of this article. The other organization of associated labor as referred to in Article 70 of this law shall also be subject to the penalty for the misdemeanors stated in Subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Paragraph 1 of this article.

The person responsible in the organization of associated labor shall also be subject to a fine of not less than 2,000 and not more than 20,000 dinars for a misdemeanor consisting of the actions enumerated in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article 94

An organization of associated labor or other juridical person shall be subject to a fine of not less than 5,000 and not more than 100,000 dinars for a misdemeanor in the following cases:

1) if it delivers to a carrier or itself transports weapons and pieces of military equipment which constitute hazardous articles contrary to the provisions of this law or regulations on security of the transport of armament and military equipment (Article 84);

2) if it does not keep the prescribed records on armament and military equipment which it purchases, holds for its own needs, keeps for another, or possesses on whatsoever basis or if it does not report the disappearance of armament and military equipment or parts of them to the competent agency within the prescribed period (Article 86).

The person responsible in the organization of associated labor or other juridical person shall also be subject to a fine of not less than 2,000 and not more than 20,000 dinars for a misdemeanor involving an action as referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

XI. Transitional and Final Provisions

Article 95

The organizations of associated labor referred to in Article 7 of this law are required to bring their general self-management acts and their organization and business operation into conformity with the provisions of this law within a period of 1 year from the date when this law takes effect.

Article 96

Regulations and other acts which have been adopted in the field of the manufacture and sale of armaments and military equipment by the Federal Executive Council and federal adminisdrative agencies before the date when this law takes effect shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this law within 6 months from the date when this law takes effect.

Article 97

On the day when this law takes effect the provisions of Article 78, Article 79, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Articles 80 through 84, and Article 222, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 10, 11 and 12, of the Law on National Defense (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 22, 1974) and the provisions of Article 4 of the Law on Depreciation of Capital Assets of Basic Organizations of Associated Labor and Other Users of Socially Owned Assets (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 58, 1976) shall cease to be valid.

Article 98

This law shall take effect on the eighth day after publication in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

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PROBLEM OF PLURALISM IN SELF-MANAGEMENT SOCIETY DISCUSSED

Belgrade SOCIJALIZAM in Serbo-Croatian No 7-8, Jul-Aug 79 pp 145-160

[Article by Vucina Vasovic: "The Problems and the Realization of Pluralistic Interests Under a System of Socialist Self-Management"]

[Text] Pluralism, a familiar and widely used conceptual term in political theory for more than half a century now, has never been defined in completely concrete terms nor has it been spared from contradictions and controversy. But regardless of its ambiguity, complexity and vagueness, the idea of pluralism survives in all of its generalized and diverse definitions, at least within the general ken or wake of most works on political theory, as a unique creation or achievement of the West, an idea which is even now being used and played up as a unique characteristic and bulwark of western democracy. The perception and persistence of pluralism, at least in its heretofore most representative versions, as a sort of market-economy-competitive or interest-group oriented pluralism and multiparty political system has only served to bolster this feeling and perception.

So it is no wonder that a large part of the body of literature on socialist political theory evinces a certain amount of skepticism and mistrust toward this brand of pluralism. To become reconciled to these kinds of interpretations is the easiest thing in the world for contemporary political theory. One of the possible and probable consequences of the acceptance of this concept of pluralism might be that socialism too will continue to isolate itself from the danger of infection by this western "parasite" and thereby insure the stability and purity of its own course of socialist development.

But it is now becoming more and more necessary that we should ask ourselves whether this is really possible. Can socialism afford to ignore and stubbornly evade the question of pluralism? It seems to us that the reality of the modern world and the general course of social and democratic development indicate that this would be hard to do. In a certain sense the evolution of democracy itself is fomenting and, one might even say, exposing the problem of pluralism. This is especially true in view of the fact that democracy is, if not a form of the transcendance of political power, at least a means by which limits can be imposed on political power. And

one of the effective ways in which limits can be imposed on political power under certain conditions is, to be sure, its demonopolization. This process is reflected to a large extent in the form of polycentric decision-making. We can thus say that a multiplicity of decision-making loci, or polycentrism, operates as an almost inherent characteristic of democracy.

Of course, in saying this we must add a note of caution by observing that pluralism is not synonymous with democracy. Pluralism may be functionally and substantively democratic within the context of a given political system or society solely to the extent that appropriate conditions exist that are conducive to its operation, meaning in this case that specific means must exist for the implementation of pluralism.

A General Definition of Pluralism

As was pointed out above, the prevailing, official and unofficial, "western" and socialist notion of the term defines pluralism mainly in terms of its relationship to bourgeois theory and practice. According to the most recent alternative definitions of pluralism, this identification has gone so far as to brand pluralism as an entirely distinct political-institutional arrangement. Pluralistic elitism and the ideology of multipartyism have become the incarnation and raison d'etre of pluralism. This notion reduces pluralism to the point where it is seen as being nothing more than several more or less formal institutional features of western society, institutions which may be, but are not necessarily most relevant to the functioning or understanding of the political process as a system. In any event, as defined in this manner, pluralism is relegated to a relatively confined regional or class dimension.

It has already been pointed out that this distilled and rather pitiful brand of pluralism could not prove to be all that attractive to most of the socialist and underdeveloped countries. New factors are now coming into play which make it reasonable and feasible to give broader definition to the concept of pluralism and to consider it from a broader historical perspective. Some socialist writers are also using pluralism as a framework and as a vehicle for expounding their own views on democracy. In so doing it seems that it would be possible to go a step further and that a more thorough analysis could shed light on some of the pluralistic premises, elements and implications of the teachings of the Marxist classics.

So it appears that the time has indeed come for a certain reinterpretation or redefinition of pluralism. Naturally, this implies a certain "opening up" of pluralism toward Marxism, but equally an "opening up" of socialism and Marxism toward pluralism. This is especially important since the socialist historical experience has revealed the extent of the danger posed by the bureaucratization and monopolization of political power.

Of course, along with other conditions and to a certain extent, pluralism could serve as a suitable means by which a society can resist, defend itself against, circumvent or suppress this danger without having to fear that it will succumb to that other, opposite extreme temptation--anachronistic individualism or unbridled anarchism. Pluralism is more

compatible with the nature of man and society than omnipotent and omnipresent statist totalitarianism, which in the course of its historical evolution (or stagnation) has consistently "got the jump on" or "skipped over" the individual who is seen to be nothing more than a minute, insignificant cipher or cog in the enormous machinery of the state, or, on the other hand, individualism, which, sooner or later, clears the way for the classification or definition of man as a purely self-centered and acquisitive being. Pluralism enables man to participate in an organized effort to realize his rights without at the same time becoming a slave of any one organization.

Pluralism is, among other things, also an attempt to establish an organized and democratic political life in modern mass societies. It somehow manages to strike a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society, between the part and the whole. It repudiates the globalist and statist interpretation of social life according to which the various forms of sociopolitical activity are deemed to be nothing more than the mere creations of the state as well as those liberal philosophies which view society as being a mechanistic amalgamation of individuals and individual behaviors. Pluralism does not relegate man to a position of isolation vis-a-vis the state or those other forces which seek to appease or pacify him for the sake of the greater and long-term interests of society, rather it opens the way for the organized and voluntary association of individuals as members of society and for the development of their awareness of the vital necessity of the whole, but also their awareness of the lifelessness of the whole if it fails to leave room for the fuller life of its individual parts.

Can it be that some brand of pluralism is not an unavoidable necessity for a society which wished to move faster toward democratization and to enable the individual to participate fully in the political decision-making process at all levels and under conditions of social ownership of the means of production? Is it not true that democratic decision-making is in a certain sense a means for the realization and practical "functioning" of social property, and is this not what the pluralism of decision-making centers is striving for insofar as it "wishes" to become a practical reality? Under these conditions it would be ridiculous and anachronistic to reduce pluralism to being nothing more than a few characteristic features of western society.

So if it is, in principle at least, an opportunity, expression or lever of democracy, pluralism is nevertheless not democracy's problem either. Especially when one takes into account the social relations and conditions that exist in reality, and not just the ideal model of a democratic society. It seems to us that pluralism confronts democracy with at least four major questions, insofar as we perceive democracy not just in terms of popular participation in decision-making and management processes, but also, as Lenin pointed out, as a means for the resolution of certain social contradictions and problems.

First of all, the question arises as to how to go about finding optimal, effective and efficient means for regulating social affairs and conflicts under conditions marked by the existence of a multiplicity of interests and relatively autonomous centers of decision-making in society. Second, how does pluralism relate to the problem of social integration? Third, how is it possible in a pluralistic social environment to consciously lead society in a specific direction and to surmount the blocking or paralyzing effects of an equilibrium of relations and forces insofar as and if these forces are equally matched or roughly equal? In other words, how is it possible under these conditions to bring about more thorough and more rapid social changes? Fourth, how is it possible in a pluralistic society, which is always characterized by a certain degree of equilibrium, to insure compliance with specified democratic practices in terms of the relations that exist within pluralistic decision-making centers or loci?

It seems to us that the basic differences between the individual schools of pluralistic theory can be sought out precisely by examining the special emphasis placed on these questions and the ways in which they are resolved The various modalities of pluralism also represent, among other things, attempts to find ways in which to properly pose and resolve these questions. And it must be confessed that these are some of the most important questions facing democracy. In saying this we are not so much raising the question whether democracy is possible or necessary, but rather how democracy is possible. And if this problem is posed in this way, then it is impossible to avoid dealing with the issue of pluralism.

A New Concept of Pluralism

The political system of Yugoslavia proceeds from the proposition that pluralism is neither an exclusive property of bourgeois democracy nor the antithesis of socialism. What is more, an advanced socialist self-management society is also implicitly a pluralistic society, though to be sure this is a unique and different kind of pluralism. These implicit pluralistic features are to found in the underlying premises and concept of such a society. Only a few of these fundamental concepts will be enumerated here.

First of all, one needs to mention the fact that such a society is oriented toward the transcendance of the notion which divides society's members into those who govern and those who are governed and, in this connection, toward the idea of the withering away of the state and governmental authority. It is patently clear that the process of the withering away of the state cannot begin until alternative democratic mechanisms are established which will be capable, while allowing for the maximum participation of the working people and citizens, of managing public affairs and settling disputes. Several such nongovernmental sociopolitical or management structures already exist in Yugoslavia, and among these one should single out for special mention the institution of self-managing interest communities. But if the process encompassing the transfer of powers from the state to other self-managing social structures is moving along at a gradual pace, this does not mean that the state has lost its raison d'etre. Even though its power and range of action have been curtailed considerably, the state still has to serve as an effective and significant force in the exercise of its limited powers.

The changing nature of the state per se is being accompanied by changes in the nature of its proprietrary interests. The working people are beginning to exercise direct control over the means and products of their social labor, which are no longer deemed to be the sole property of the state. Under conditions marked by more widespread social property ownership, which is not considered to be synonymous with state property ownership, democracy and self-management are becoming a natural form of the disposition or creation of social property. Naturally, all of this calls for a multiplicity of centers and loci which make decisions concerning the disposition and management of the means and end results of labor.

In addition, we should mention, as the third basic premise of a pluralistic socialist society, the conviction that democracy and self-management require that the system and process of decision-making should be organized in such a way that the decision-making centers will be in close proximity to the working man and citizen or in close enough proximity so that the working people and citizens can participate in their deliberations either directly or through their elected delegates. This is also the principle which we must bear in mind in order to discover the underlying purpose behind the establishment and priority status of basic organizations of associated labor, which are the princpal agents of the creation and distribution of income and the mainstays of the capital replacement process, and the primary territorial local communities.

Fourthly, the national makeup of such a society and the conviction that all of its nations and nationalities must enjoy full rights of self-determination and full equal rights in decision-making processes necessarily leads to the establishment of multiple decision-making centers.

To all of this one must add the guiding policy of the League of Communists which holds that the basic thrust of its activities is geared not toward promoting the interests of the state, but rather toward promoting the basic self-management substance and form of all decision-making, first and foremost in the places where the working people and citizens live and work, and that all other political and management mechanisms are by-products of these basic building blocks of society's life and work. This role of the League of Communists "emancipates" other sociopolitical organizations, especially the Socialist Alliance and the Confederation of Trade Unions, from the need to serve as mere transmission belts. These organizations are being transformed into independent agents of socialist self-management development, not mere mechanisms which carry out decisions made by the League of Communists and the state.

All of these institutions serve as channels for bringing about the genuine socialization of political life and for the deemphasis of the role of the state, institutions which by virtue of their very nature and existence are repositories of elements of pluralism. It is quite clear that this is not some kind of simplistic market-competitive, interest-group or multiparty pluralism. The pluralism of decision-making and interest-group centers that are organized and function along self-management lines is

also manifested in the structure of corresponding political mechanisms, even those at the highest levels such as the assemblies and the Socialist Alliance.

The three-tier assembly structure and decision-making procedures incorporating a certain degree of autonomy exercised by the individual assembly councils are supposed to give expression to and secure the influence of the basic institutions of society's life, work and political activity in the supreme organs of political power and decision-making. The structure and decision-making procedures of political bodies at the federation level are an even stronger expression of this social pluralism. The Socialist Alliance is also a kind of pluralistic structure, and in a certain way it might even be said to be an organization of organizations. And the decision-making procedures employed by the basic components of this broadly based organization are a manifestation of the plurality of interests and demands which are articulated by the delegations of diverse sociopolitical organizations.

Problems Associated With Making Pluralism a Practical Reality

It is self-evident that pluralism is not the sine qua non of self-management democracy. If under certain circumstances democracy by definition implies the existence of pluralism, democracy can still not be reduced to being synonymous with pluralism.

There can be no doubt but that this kind of open-ended system allowing for the free expression of interests and the broadest possible popular participation in the decision-making process permits differing perceptions and views of the same problems to become involved in this process, and, therefore, more so than in the case of any other system, this system also calls for the establishment of principles and mechanisms which are conducive to a democratic synthesis of these differing views and interests so as to allow the decision-making process and the management of public affairs to proceed in a normal manner. If this part of the system is not set up in a proper manner, then the significance of all of the aforementioned pluralistic structures and, on a higher plane, the articulative functions of the political system, is considerably diminished or may be very quickly transformed into instruments of manipulation.

This is why Yugoslavia is making an effort to seek out and put in place precisely these kinds of mechanisms and processes of the democratic integration of diverse and multitudinous forms of participatory decision-making. Among these principles and mechanisms special reference needs to be made to the socialist self-management nature of our political institutions, the dominant position of the working class, direct management and the assembly or delegate system whose goal is to insure the vertical and horizontal communication of ideas and interests--from the basic organizational structures of society's life and work to the relevant centers of political decision-making. These principles and mechanisms are also inextricably bound up with the principle and system of cooperative federalism, which serves to optimize

the decision-making processes and decisions for every republic and province. Among all of these instrumentalities of self-management integration special emphasis should also be placed on the very important role played by self-management accords and social compacts as well as on the limited and in large part back-up role played by the state. To be sure, this also includes the very important role played by sociopolitical organizations or the organized and progressive conscious forces of society.

There are two key questions or problems which seem to be of overriding concern to us today, namely, whether add to what extent does this kind of open system, probably the most open system in the world when viewed from a comparative-historical standpoint (by virtue of the fact that it admits to and freely articulates its own contradictions and conflicts), diminish or magnify the insensity of these conflicts and, secondly, to what extent is this system capable of effectively and democratically, that is, in keeping with the principles of self-management, managing these social conflicts and insuring the identification of optimal alternatives in the final phases of the decision-making process, thereby contributing to the all-round development of society and to the steering of this development in a specific direction. While acknowledging the wealth of positive experience and knowledge that has already been gained along these lines, it is still necessary to single out a number of questions that are still unresolved.

It is our view that an advanced social system dedicated to the free articulation of interests and to the encouragement of participatory decision-making is not always and under all circumstances bound to culminate in the disappearance of or even in the diminution of conflicts and contradictions. This is above all due to the fact that such a system may lead to and as a rule does lead to a proliferation of demands and, on an even much more sensitive score, to the fostering of the expectation that all of life's basic problems can be resolved very quickly by means of political activism and participation. However, looking at things realistically, it is hard to imagine that in the present economic environment such expectations could be realized so quickly soely by means of political participation and activism. Moreover, a standing invitation to engage in participatory decision-making at all times and on all issues and the acceptance of this invitation, coupled with exaggerated expectations and heightened distributive "predispositions," under conditions characterized by limited economic resources and in the absence of certain other prerequisities, may exacerbate social conflicts even more, in addition to giving rise to disproportionate expenditures of energy and an excessive preoccupation with the organization of decision-making processes and participatory forums on redistributive questions, and also pose the danger that political policies will be formulated in response to the force of circumstantial pressures, and not in response to the delineation of optimal alternatives. The task of the organized progressive forces of our society must now be to discover and build up those kinds of selective mechanisms circumscribed within socialist and self-management contexts and, naturally, to foster those kinds of objective conditions which will minimize these dangers as much as possible or eliminate them altogether. Political science should seek to make a contribution along these lines by spelling out these conditions in concrete terms.

Apart from this, the question also arises as to whether this decentralization of influence and the establishment of decision-making centers at the lowest levels and in the closest possible proximity to the working people and citizens might not lead to the formation of new power centers and, at the same time, to the creation of new hierarchies within these social microorganizations as well as to their partial isolation from the rest of society. This is a question of the kinds of conditions under which these new organizations, which are smaller and more accessible to the working man, will not succumb those kinds of distortions, among which there are two that seem to be especially harmful and possible: first, the possibility that they will be transformed into an institutional structure which isolates certain groups from the rest of society, instead of serving as an institution which assimilates the working people into society along self-management lines, and, second, the possibility that narrow groups or isolated individuals will gain a monopoly control over the power and decision-making authority of these organizations. To whatever extent the view which holds that the deconcentration of power and the formation of smaller-scale organizations as decision-making frameworks are conducive to greater democratization seems to be correct the belief that these two dimensions, a priori and under all circumstances, exist in a positive correlative relationship does not appear by the same token to be entirely justified. Moreover, experience shows that sometimes and under certain conditions a more rigid hierarchial and authoritarian pattern of relations is more likely to be established in a smaller organization than in a large one.

And while we are on the subject of the phenomenon-institution of compacts and accords, which without a doubt represents the life's blood of a democratic self-management system, it is hard to resist the temptation to raise certain other questions. In this sense the relationship that should exist between the process of reaching compacts and accords and the assembly system and the principle of indivisibility in the exercise of governmental authority seems to us to be especially important, even though at first glance this might appear to be a trifling matter. Stated in very general terms, this question might be posed as follows: is there a danger and tendency in practice that this open system of perpetual consensus building, which is a product of the framework of the assembly mechanism, may, by means of the pre-assembly or post-assembly decision-making process, that is, either a priori or a posteriori, at least partially "expropriate" some of the assembly's legitimate rights?

It is possible and to what extent is it possible and necessary to institutionalize and regulate this process of extra-assembly consensus-building and to establish it as a complementary factor of the assembly decision-making process?

How can the current and long-term interests of the working class be safeguarded within the context of the process of self-management decision-making? This is all the more urgent since within the working class itself

there exist contradictions which are a product of the multi-tiered stratification of the working class and the diverse interests of its individual strata.

The Determinants of the Democratic and Socialist Functions of Pluralism

It goes without saying that pluralism does not hang suspended in a vacuum and that a number of prerequisites must be fulfilled in order for it to realize its democratic and socialist potential. Pluralism must also be correlated with the basic goals which society sets fors itself and it must make provisions for the total involvement of society's creative and progressive forces. This is why it seems that in socialist societies pluralism may produce beneficial results only insofar as certain broadly defined social prerequisites are met. Firstly, only insofar as it is assured that the socialist forces, above all the working class, will play a leading role in society. Secondly, only insofar as provisions are made to allow for the "self-expression of all social forces which acknowledge the socialist character of society and the self-managing status of the working class in that society." In other words, this means that provisions must be made within the system of socialist self-management democracy itself to insure the unquestioned leading role of the interests of the working class, interests which are closely bound up with the interests of all other working people, and that participation in the exercise of this leading role will be open to all who accept this fact.[1] As E. Kardelj says, "we would now find outselves living in a dream world if we wanted to employ these and similar concepts, such as classless democracy or abstract universal freedom, as a means of resolving real social conflicts in which freedom for one class is inevitably tantamount to the servitude or subjugation of another class."[2]

Thirdly, pluralism can produce democratic results only insofar as an attempt is made to insure internal self-management in pluralistic centers of decision-making. This is why direct participation and self-management in basic and all other organizations of community life, work and self-government represent an essential precondition to broader democratization and to the prevention of the establishment of pluralism as a polyhierarchical form of elitism.

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1. E. Kardelj. "Pravci razvoja politickog sistema socijalistickog samoupravljanja" [Trends in the Evolution of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management], KOMUNIST Publishing House, Belgrade, 1977.

2. Op. cit.

"People of conservative-dogmatic persuasions," Karkelj goes on to warn, "who look upon the political pluralism of bourgeois society as the sole feasible option allowing for the manifestation of man's democratic instincts do not understand that this kind of political pluralism--notwithstanding the progressive historical role which it played in the advancement of democratic thought--has even so continued to function as an institutional form which imposes limits on the true and authentic social pluralism which is based on genuine communities of interest. Political (bourgeois--author's note) pluralism acknowledges freedom in society only for certain interests while at the same time repudiating and suppressing other interests."[3] In contrast to this kind of pluralism the "pluralism of self-management interests" in fact represents a broad spectrum of action within which working people and citizens, organized within their territorial and work organizations and communities, freely express their interests, resolve disputed questions and conflicts through agreements or set general policy guidelines. Socialist democracy therefore transcends the reduction of pluralism either to the limited, conventional concept of a division of political power or to a system providing for the interaction of a multiplicity of hierarchies, elites or parties.

Sociopolitical Pluralism and the League of Communists

Nor is there any need to keep stressing the point that it would be illusory to even entertain the notion that it would be possible for this kind of open and democratic system of socialist self-management to consolidate itself and to continue itself and to continue its development in the absence of an appropriate level of activism on the part of society's conscious and subjective forces, that is, in the absence of sociopolitical organizations, especially the League of Communists. It is equally clear that the character of these organizations must differ from that of conventional party organizations. From a mechanism, which under conditions marked by the increasing centralization of political power and the emergence of an omnipotent and omnipresent state is not infrequently transformed into an auxillary or integral part of the state apparatus, thereby becoming merely another lever of pressure within a broadly based system of oppression, sociopolitical organizations under self-management are transformed into a lever for the further and perpetual development of self-management relations as frameworks for decision-making and for the management of public affairs. Under this kind of transitional social system the status of these sociopolitical organizations becomes rather complex and the functions they perform are manifold.

While we are on the subject of the League of Communists we should stress the importance of its general policy and efforts geared toward the identification of one of its key functions as consisting in laying the groundwork for the genuine development of self-management and for involving the working people and citizens in the democratic decision-making process on the broadest possible scale.

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3. Op. cit.

It is for this very reason that this organization is most active in self-management structures so that the process encompassing the conscious channeling and the articulation of interests or demands on the broadest possible scale can be synchronized and synthesized at the same time as when decisions are being made in these most common self-management institutions. As a result, for the first time in history, we are witnesses to a situation in which the party which is "in power" does not traffic in government appointments and does not resort to the use of the conventional instrumentalities of state and law as the preferred levers for the realization of its policies.

The underlying purpose behind the existence and functioning of a political party consists in the fulfillment of its role as a leading and integrating social force, and it fulfills this role not through the state or the exercise of political power, but rather by means of its capability to understand the conditions, general laws or potential for development, as well as by means of its ability to rally the most broadly based and progressive forces of society around its action program.

However, one should not think that the League of Communists is a priori destined to successfully lead society and to function as the force which binds it together. It is also impossible to expect that this should be so due to the fact that under conditions marked by a broad pluralism of interests, the open nature of our society and the commitment of the League of Communists to find new ways of carrying out its functions, as well as due to the sheer size of its membership (approximately 1,700,000 members), a number of the contradictions which exist in society at large are also bound to be absorbed into the body of the League of Communists.

Moreover, it is not ruled out that existing social contradictions might manifest themselves in an even more drastic or severe manner within the League of Communists. There are two reasons why this might happen. First, due to the fact that an organization, whose ideology postulates equality as one of its most cherished values, becomes sensitive to manifestations of inequality within its own ranks. Second, because the League of Communists itself comprises social strata and structures which occupy the highest ranking positions in the social division of labor, as well as those who are on the very bottom rung of the social "ladder." The lack of "privileges" deriving from the mere fact that one is a member of the LCY is most noticeable among those members who, in a sense, belong to these objectively unprivileged social strata and structures.

Consequently, the following crucial question must be asked. Namely, to what extent does social stratification within the League of Communists, which virtually represents a picture in miniature of the kind of stratification that exists in society as a whole, have an impact on the ideology, unanimity and actions of the League of Communists and how can the League of Communists protect itself against the adverse consequences of this internal and otherwise, to a certain extent, necessary stratification or diversification?

As was already pointed out, these circumstances and differences leave a lasting impression on society's level of self-consciousness and are conducive to differing perceptions of certain values. A study of this problem cannot fail but to confirm the otherwise readily discernible fact that the overall social status, which is somehow crystallized and manifested in their material status of members of the League of Communists also has a major impact on the shaping of their views and predilections, especially so when we are talking about those more specific transitional values or goals which impinge upon the immediate current interests of individual social strata or groups. The fundamental and general goals, such as socialism, are equally acceptable to all social strata. Differences of opinion begin to merge in the perception and interpretation of those somewhat more specific "medium-sized" values or goals, such as equality or freedom, which in the minds of those belonging to different social strata, by virtue of their immediate practical implications and consequences, are split up in different ways. A larger percentage of the more comfortably situated social strata place a higher premium on freedom than they do on equality, and conversely, less comfortably situated social strata give priority to equality while at the same time stressing the need for political vigilance and the safeguarding of this value.

It is interesting to note that, in spite of all this, the League of Communists represents the most cohesive component of our social structure and that the effect of differences in social position on the ideological predispositions of LC members is less pronounced than the effect of these distinctions on the ideological views and predispositions of those who are not LC members. What are the causes of these phenomena? Without pretending to discuss all of the possible reasons for this in detail, we will mention only those reasons which seem to be especially significant. First, one should point out the more or less uniform outlook of LC members with respect to basic strategic goals, including in particular the building of a socialist and communist society. Second, there is the fact that ideological and political education and ideological work generally is more intensive in the League of Communists than in other social settings or in society as a whole. Third, even though it does not carry with it any special privileges, membership in the LC creates a sense of belonging and a sense of the possibility that one can count on the support of such an important and respected organization, a factor which cannot be discounted from either a social or psychological standpoint. Fourth, democratic centralism, as the principle which governs the organizational structure and activities of the LC, constitutes a framework for the united action of its members, regardless of any differences of opinion on individual issues. Fifth, one should not forget the revolutionary and strong traditions of the League of Communists.

Nevertheless, one should not look for the reasons behind the ideological and political unity of the LC and its ability to act as a cohesive social force solely within the LC itself, but also within the broader

societal context. At this point is it especially necessary to stress the impression, an impression which is being borne out by some research in this area,[4] that there exists a fairly high level of consensus among diverse social strata or in society as a whole concerning certain fundamental values. The percentage of the population which does not favor social property ownership, equality, socialism, labor and self-management is a small one. This is also grounds for the conclusion that there are no widespread antagonistic contradictions and conflicts in our society, at least as far as the above mentioned values are concerned.

But, on the other hand, this does not give us any grounds to console ourselves with illusions about how we have already achieved a conflict-free society or with the belief that all antagonistic contradictions and conflicts have disappeared without a trace. The depth and dimensions of these possibly latent or effectively antagonistic conflicts are today a function of, among other things, the international environment in which various systems and ideologies are functioning. An open and democratic society, which is also to say a self-management society, is unquestionably susceptible to the effects of these kinds of different ideologies which pursue different lines of reasoning or "attach" themselves to different social strata or groups, also depending on what it is that they are offering or promising. It is self-evident that the League of Communists must seek out and find those kinds of effective democratic and ideological ways and means that will serve to neutralize the negative effects of these ideologies.

The fact that social strata at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum, as measured in terms of their material wealth, which also includes a percentage of the working class, declare themselves to be in favor of greater equality and more political intervention is frequently interpreted as sufficient evidence and proof of the authoritarian predispositions or inherent anti-democratic traits of the working class.

The implications of these kinds of basically bourgeois interpretations,[5] against which even a certain number of our own political scientists are not immune, are legion. According to this interpretation it is the working class or those who are employed in non-administrative or nonmanagerial jobs, who opt for greater equality and its safeguarding with sociopolitical guarantees and who, under certain conditions, may even be statists, less democratically inclined than other social strata and practitioners of administrative and leadership functions, who give priority to freedom in relation to equality and who for this very reason ought to behave more democratically.

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4. Vide S. Bolcic. "Interesi drustvenih slojeva i determinante njihovog formiranja" [Social-strata Interests and the Determinants of their Formation] in the book by M. Popovic et al entitled "Drustveni slojevi i drustvena svest" [Social Strata and Social Consciousness], Social Sciences Institute, Belgrade, 1977, p 119.

5. This interpretation is explicitly mentioned in the works of Martin Lipset, especially in his book "Political Man."

This outlook is merely a new version of the otherwise rather dated Tocquevillean proposition[6] about the incompatibility of equality and freedom, that is, it proposed that in a given society equality can be achieved only at the price of freedom and the unleashing of a totalitarian political movement and that freedom, as a fundamental trait of democracy, is possible only at the price of equality. No great amount of wisdom or insight is needed in order to perceive the primary ideological inspiration of this point of view. Back in the days which were characterized by the ever faster advancement of socialist thought, which from its very beginnings and in its first stirrings gave support to the ideal of equality, and by the emergence of an ever stronger workers and socialist movement, which discovered and demonstrated its ever greater strength and willingness to make a practical reality of these ideals or, to put it in a better way, aspirations, it was necessary to develop a vehicle and an ideology which would counteract this expansion of socialist ideas and man the ramparts of bourgeois values and the status quo, with all of its existing inequalities and its system of property relations. The incessant repetition of this basic thesis continues right up to our own day.

Recent history has demystified and unmasked the true substance and intent of this antiegalitarian brand of freedom. It has shown that socialism and democracy or socialist democracy can be built only insofar as it is firmly secured to both of these fundamental pillars of its constitution. A system which is based on freedom without equality is sooner or later reduced to institutionalized pragmatism, which affirms and gives free rein to the de facto stronger forces in society, or to a system dedicated to the observance of meaningless rules of procedure. Freedom, if it is to be real and meaningful, must be freedom for all, and in terms of this quality it is in a certain sense, among other things, also an element, both a cause and effect, of equality. On the other hand, it is difficult to realize and guarantee equality without freedom. Equality is therefore one of the attributes of freedom. In order to lead a free life people must to some extent be mutually equal. Otherwise freedom is merely a pro forma concept if not a lie or obfuscation.

By the same token, we must not lose sight of the fact that history has also alerted us to the dangers inherent in those tendencies and phenomena whereby equality is expolited as a basic foothold and means of legitimizing totalitarian policies and the positions of political leaders, a practice which sooner or later, regardless of motives, leads to distortions and irregularities. In such a case as this it is absolutely essential, for the sake of the further development of democracy, that an effort should be made to affirm and accentuate the importance of freedom. Unfortunately, and for specific reasons, this value has not yet been accorded the priority it deserves in the socialist world.

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6. For Tocqueville socialism, whose central premise is, of course, equality, is either "monstrous," "grotesque," "comical," or "delirious." Vide Tocqueville's "Oeuvres Completes," Paris, 1951.

It of course needs to be pointed out here that the term equality is not being interpreted as being tantamount to absolute egalitarianism, and so the real question at issue has nothing to do with the dilemma of having to decide between equality or freedom, but rather with how to interpret and define equality and its relationship with other values within the context of a total social system.

For all of these reasons, the fears generated by the fact that certain segments of the population place greater emphasis on equality and are trying to safeguard it by means of political guarantees as well as the interpretations that this is a reliable index of their authoritarian and Stalinist inclinations are not justified. There is nothing at all unusual about the fact that those who have fewer opportunities to express their own interests and to fight for the realization of those interests in the decision-making process and who expect as a result of the balance of forces within their environment to always remain in a subordinate position will try to obtain, among other things, a certain measure of broader protection or guarantees "from above" for the realization of their rights and claims. At the same time, of course, one should not go to the opposite extreme and think that this might not also be an expression of or give a boost to certain statist philosophies and forces, but this is an entirely different problem. It must be left up to the progressive and subjective forces of a self-management society to make these distinctions. The activities of sociopolitical organizations, especially the League of Communists, should be geared toward the struggle to see to it that through the development of self-management forms of decision-making and the abolition of bureaucratic-technocratic monopolies those strata with lower-ranking social status and lower standards of living also become aware of the potential and results of their participation or influence in this process and that these forces are not labelled a priori as being undemocratic. Making an issue out of the presumed authoritarian predispositions of the working class only serves to encourage various bureaucratic-technocratically inclined and affluent groups and well-off "nouveaux riches" who are also spreading rumors to this effect in order to protect their positions and privileges.

Much of the political literature on this subject, especially in the West, frequently emphasizes the notion that pluralism or democracy is irreconcilable with a one-party system and that almost of necessity all of these non-multiparty systems continue to function along totalitarian lines. The political system of Yugoslavia and the League of Communists are seldom declared to be exempt from this "rule." In the preceding paragraphs we pointed out several of the structural and functional characteristics of the League of Communists which reveal this point of view to be superficial and essentially incorrect. Moreover, Yugoslav society itself expects the League of Communists to serve as the principal lever for its further democratization.

The League of Communists is proving itself to be a major force that serves to limit and counterbalance potential technobureaucratic tendencies and structures, especially in cases where the latter seek to turn self-management mechanisms into a mere veil that legitimizes their own de facto dominant position. And if someone starts off by looking for the actual democratic purpose behind the existence and actions of a so constituted

and functioning League of Communists, while at the same time proceeding from an awareness of the equilibrium that exists between individual factors of power and influence as an element of democracy, then he will undoubtedly find what he is looking for in this kind of system. We ascribe a great deal of relevance to the elements of the potential or actual balance of influence which is to be found today in the triangle whose individual points are represented by sociopolitical organizations, including the League of Communists in particular, the institutional structures of self-management, here referring primarily to the assembly and delegate system with its diverse forms of participatory decision-making, and, finally, the executive arm of the government, which of course includes the professional services. All of these three factors possess relatively unique sources of influence. In the case of the first factor this influence derives from its revolutionary heritage and its ability to lead society in an appropriate direction, from the general consensus in society as to the absolute need for the existence of such an organization for the sake of its further development along socialist lines, and also from the influential role it plays in setting personnel management policies; the source of the second factor's power lies in the direct participation of the general population in the actual decision-making process, something which in and of itself has always constituted a source of power, and the influence of the third factor stems from the nature of the power of the administrative function per se, in the narrow sense of the terms, and from the fact that it, by virtue of a certain logic and in large part at least, comprises the actual operational and executive institutions of society.

While we are on the subject of equilibrium as one of the possible elements of democratism and the genuine further progress of democratization it should be mentioned that it is a presence in day-to-day policymaking, but at the same time it should be noted that this kind of equilibrium cannot be interpreted or defined, that is, exploited, as a form or instrumentality for challenging or counteracting the strategic policy lines and development goals of the League of Communists and the progressive segments of the general agreement on or give their individed support to these general policy lines.

We are also stressing the importance of this qualified equilibrium due to the fact that it is not inconceivable that any of these institutional structures might, in the event of a redefinition of their status and role, succumb to possible deviations, i.e., that political organizations might be faced with the danger of their possible bureaucratization, that self-management structures might, if left to themselves, be exposed to risk of having their energy sapped by the constant and ever more intense levying of claims and the voicing of hopes for their fulfillment, claims and hopes voiced simultaneously by all of those taking part in the decision-making process, and this in turn would give rise to the danger that wherever hopes were raised for the resolution of conflicts these conflicts would be inflamed even more, with the actual resolution of these conflicts taking place in noninstitutional and informal structural settings. Such a situation would naturally tend to augment the power of the executive authorities and the professional administrative services as well as the possibility of the usurpation of power by these organs. All of the three above-mentioned power factors have their own sphere of jurisdiction, authority and functions

and all of them act and respond in a more or less independent ways, but they also coordinate or combine their activities during the political decision-making process within the framework of the larger self-management structures.

But in this regard it is necessary to add a note of caution and to bear in mind that a given type of deeper self-management democracy, in contrast to the conventional or contemporary forms of bourgeois democracy, cannot survive for much longer, much less continue to evolve merely as a manifestation of a balance of power between individual conscious political entities. To the extent that a state of equilibrium between certain forces and powers may under certain conditions be one of the important elements constituting a democracy for as long as these forces and powers continue to exist, democracy still must mean something more than this. A genuine and self-managing democratic society must develop a system in which it is possible to bring about a radical transformation and transcendance of political power, defined as a pattern of relations between subordinates superiors and as an opportunity for the direct more or less organized and free exercise of activism by the masses--a system which establishes and maintains frameworks that accommodate this equilibrium and defines its democratic character. Moreover, this organized and free mass movement, which is first and foremost a working class movement, must be capable and willing to subordinate this equilibrium to its own will and to use it as an instrument for the maintenance of its supremacy as a normal and working dimension of the social order. This is how that ever so vital "class shrewdness" begins to come into play in earnest in order to maintain its "administrative apparatus" that is divided up into institutional frameworks over which it has exclusive control. This is one of the specific ways in which a class protects itself against its own bureaucracy and bureaucratization. It must possess the capability to mediate not only between the bottom and the "top" but also between the individual components of the "administrative" apparatus whenever this is necessary. This is the way to prevent the transformation of this apparatus into an omnipotent and omnipresent institution as well as to pave the way for its effective and responsible functioning within the limits of certain specified rights and duties and as an instrumentality of the working class and the working people.

At this point, of course, the following question arises. Namely, how and by means of which instrumentalities is it possible and are existing instrumentalities sufficient so as to enable the working class and working people to keep all of this under their control? Perhaps in this area too, among others, it is necessary to look for and pinpoint the significance of such mass organizations as the Socialist Alliance. As a broadly based and mass organization it too serves as a suitable means for the self-expression of forces and movements as a whole and for the promotion of its authentic interests and claims, as well as for limiting the power of any biased institutional structure.

On the other hand, the Socialist Alliance and the other sociopolitical organizations are turning out to be a suitable framework for the democratic realization of the leading role of the League of Communists in society. If the League of Communists did not fulfill this kind of function, it would be hard for the Socialist Alliance and the trade unions to carry out their own functions. All the more so since these same organizations, which are otherwise supposed to act as integrating factors within the political system, are also and in large measure caught up in more or less the same contradictions which are being manifested in society at large. This is why it is essential that the League of Communists should play an active role as an integrating force within these organizations so that they, for their part, can adequately fulfill their function as an integrating factor in society and in the working class.

All of this serves to broaden the effective scope of the political opportunities, instrumentalities and levers in the hands of the working class and the popular masses. Depending on the needs of the moment and other circumstances, they can resort to the use of the first, second or third instrumentality or they can combine them in an appropriate way and thus employ them in the struggle against tendencies to usurp or abuse power on the part of any of these institutions or on the part of any other group. This unquestionably serves to augment the real power of the working class, but it also calls for a relatively high degree of willingness, not to mention skillfulness on its part to participate in management or self-management and to make use of its rights and institutions.

At least two things are clear about such a system dedicated to the free articulation and self-regulation of competing interests. First, that in such a broadly based mechanism geared toward the free expression of interests and multiple options for their translation into political claims and assimilation into the political decision-making process the question of deciding between a one-party system or a multiparty system in effect becomes less important and perhaps even irrelevant. A multiparty system makes sense in societies where decisions are made mainly within the elite circles of individual hierarchies, without any allowances being made for broader forms of participatory decisionmaking, and where democracy is reduced to being virtually nothing more than electoral democracy. These conditions are of course met in a representative democracy where, precisely because of the absence of broader forms of participatory decisionmaking, it is normal that political parties should serve as the primary channels and instrumentalities for the articulation of interests and their translation into political demands. Under these conditions a multiparty system does indeed serve to create greater opportunities for the articulation of interests and for making a choice between certain given alternatives, but it does so only once every 4 or 5 years--as Lenin observed long ago.

Second, it is becoming clear that such a system transcends the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat defined as a political process which by means of transmission belts flows from top to bottom. Under this kind of system the dominant position of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat is secured within the context of a democratic management process, and this is also the reason why the Constitution of the SFRY defines socialist self-management per se as both the form and true substance of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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